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ABSTRACT
The dissertation consists of three chapters that study topics related to structural change, spatial and
network data.
The first chapter considers the problem of testing for a structural change in the spatial lag
parameter in a panel model. We propose a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of no change
against the alternative hypothesis of a single change. The limiting distribution of the test is derived
under the null hypothesis when the number of time periods is large. We also propose a break-
date estimator to determine the location of the change point following evidence against the null
hypothesis. We present Monte Carlo evidence to show that the proposed procedure performs well
in finite samples. We use US state budget data to investigate changes in budget spillovers and the
interdependence of fiscal policy within US states.
The second chapter proposes a theory of cross-country migration in the form of labor mobility
based on regional and sectoral productivity shocks in a multi-country, multi-sector setting. The
productivity model when applied to US state data explains both the nominal and relative flow of
workers across the U.S. well, which is taken as the frictionless benchmark. On the other hand,
when applied to Europe the model explains the relative flow network well, but predicts a higher
nominal flow. This missing mass of migrants is explained by socio-cultural-political barriers. We
use dyadic regressions to assess the effects of institutional and cultural distance between countries
in explaining the “European immobility puzzle”.
The third chapter shows that the “iron-law” of convergence (2%) still holds for the world. We
vii
document a structural break in Africa’s convergence rate and argue that Africa was not converging
before 2000. The world convergence rate before 2000 was driven by Asian and Latin American
countries. We show that recent institutional and infrastructural developments have led the African
countries on the path of “catching up”. We use Least-Absolute-Shrinkage-and-Selection-Operator
(LASSO) to select the variables and a double selection method to estimate the treatment effect
in a partially linear model. We compare LASSO variable selections with those obtained using
Gradient-Boosting-Method (GBM) and Random Forest.
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1Chapter 1
Testing for a Structural Break in a Spatial Panel Model
We consider the problem of testing for a structural break in the spatial lag parameter in a panel
model. We propose a likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of no break against the alternative
hypothesis of a single break. The limiting distribution of the test is derived under the null when
both the number of individual units N and the number of time periods T is large or N is fixed and
T is large. The asymptotic critical values of the test staitistic can be obtained analytically. We also
propose a break-date estimator that can be employed to determine the location of the break point
following evidence against the null hypothesis. We present Monte Carlo evidence to show that the
proposed procedure performs well in finite samples. Finally, we consider an empirical application
of the test on budget spillovers and interdependence in fiscal policy within US states.
1.1 Introduction
Spatial dependence represents a situation where values observed at one location or region depend
on the values of neighboring observations at nearby locations. One may ask two questions: first,
does this dependence stay the same over time; and second, what might cause the dependence to
change? This chapter answers the first question by proposing a likelihood ratio test of the null
hypothesis of no change against the alternative hypothesis of a one-time change. In case there
is evidence against the null hypothesis, the chapter consequently proposes a break-date estimator.
The second question has been reflected upon through an empirical application of budget spillovers
in US states.
In the setup of spatial panel models with N individual units (geographic locations such as coun-
tries and zip codes or network units like firms and individuals) observed over T number of periods,
where the outcome of each unit depends on its “neighbor’s” outcome, there exists a problem of
endogeneity. Hence such models are estimated using maximum likelihood or generalized method
of moments. Similar to the univariate time series case, in this chapter a sup LR test is proposed and
2the asymptotics are derived for large T cases.
In comparison to the vast literature on change point for univariate series, the corresponding
literature for panel data is quite small. One of the most popular and early tests in the univariate
literature is the popular F test of Chow [1960], which has been modified for cases of unknown
and multiple break dates in Andrews [1993], Andrews and Ploberger [1994] and Bai and Perron
[1998] among others. Bai [1997], Bai et al. [1998] and Qu and Perron [2007] have extended the
single equation break models to multiple ones. They show that using multiple system improves the
estimation precision of the break dates and the power of the tests. Perron [2006] provides a survey
of the literature.
In the panel data literature, Bai [2010] establishes consistency of the estimated common break
point, achievable even if there is a single observation in a regime. The paper proposes a new
framework for developing the limiting distribution for the estimated break point and lays down
steps to construct confidence intervals. The least squares method is used for estimating breaks in
means. Feng et al. [2009] study a multiple regression model in a panel setting where a break occurs
at an unknown common date. They establish consistency and rate of convergence both for a fixed
time horizon and large panels. In Feng et al. [2009] the limiting distribution is derived without the
assumption of shrinking magnitude of break. Liao [2008] uses the Bayesian method for estimation
and inference about structural breaks in a panel.
Han and Park [1989] develop a multivariate cusum test in order to test for a structural break
in panel data and they apply the test to US manufacturing goods trade data. Emerson and Kao
[2000] propose two classes of test statistics for detecting a break at an unknown date in panel data
models with time trend. The first is a fluctuation test while the second is based on the mean and
exponential Wald statistics of Andrews and Ploberger [1994] and the maximum Wald statistic of
Andrews [1993]. Wachter and Tzavalis [2012] develop a break detecting testing procedure for the
AR(p) linear panel data with exogenous or pre-determined regressors. The method accommodates
structural break in the slope parameters as well as fixed effects and no assumption is imposed on the
homogeneity of cross-sectional fixed effects. Pauwels et al. [2012] provide a structural break test
for heterogeneous panel data models, where the break affects some but not all cross-section units
3in the panel. The test is robust to auto-correlated errors. The test statistic is based on comparing
pre and post break sample statistics as in Chow [1960].
A higher availability of geocoded socio-economic datasets has led to a vast expansion of the
study of spatial interaction between economics agents. Moreover, the recursive relationship be-
tween agents in a network can be modeled using spatial econometric methods. Spatial dependence
represents the transmission of developments across “neighboring” agents. Elhorst [2010] provides
detailed methodologies for estimating spatial panels and to compare competing models. The above
tests in the panel literature do not explicitly consider the endogeneity problem in the model, which
arises from the spatial dependence. We consider a spatial autoregressive model and provide a test
for a break in the spatial lag parameter. To test for a change in the spatial dependence parameter
we propose a sup LR test similar to Bai [1999]. Yu et al. [2008] and Lee and Yu [2010] provide the
asymptotic properties of quasi-maximum likelihood estimators for spatial autoregressive panel data
models with fixed effects. The results from Yu et al. [2008] are used to derive the limit distribution
of the sup LR test for large T. An estimator for the break date is proposed that can be employed
once evidence against no break in the spatial lag parameter is obtained. The performance of this es-
timator as well as the proposed test statistic in small samples is evaluated via a Monte Carlo study.
Wied [2013] develops a CUSUM-type test for time-varying parameters in a spatial autoregressive
model for stock returns. The power of the sup LR test is compared with the CUSUM test.
Case et al. [1993] show that a state’s budget expenditure depends on the spending of similar1
states. Therefore, a rise in a “neighboring” state’s expenditure results in an increase in the state’s
own expenditure. As an empirical application, we apply the likelihood ratio test to the budget
dependence of US states over time. The data consists of annual observations for the continen-
tal United States during the period 1960-2011. States that are economically similar are defined
as neighbors. The test result shows that the null hypothesis of no break in the spatial depen-
dence parameter is rejected and the break date is estimated as 1982. The budget spillover is more
pronounced post break. Details of the results and intuitions on why there might be a break are
1Case et al. [1993] define similar states in three different ways - 1) similar in location, 2) similar in income 3) similar
in racial composition.
4discussed.
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 2.2, the spatial lag model is presented and
discussed. Section 1.3 provides motivating examples where the test can be applied. We propose
a sup LR test, which is described in section 1.4. The limiting distribution of the test is stated in
section 1.5. The outline of the proof is also provided in this section (details are in the Appendix).
In the event of a rejection of null hypotheis, we propose a break date estimator in section 1.6. The
finite sample properties of the test and the estimator are discussed in section 1.7. Finally, we apply
the test to budget spillovers in US states, in section 1.8. It shows that there was a change in the
budget dependence between similar income states.
1.2 Spatial Lag Model
Let us consider a simple pooled linear regression model
yit = xitβ + it, (1.1)
where i is an index of cross-sectional dimension, with i = 1,...,N, and t is an index for the time
dimension, with t = 1,...,T . We discuss all the results using “time” as the second dimension;
however for a general spatial lag model, the second dimension could very well reflect another
cross-sectional characteristic, such as the industry sector or the number of classes or groups. yit
is an observation on the dependent variable at i and t, xit a 1 × K vector of observations on the
(exogenous) explanatory variables including the intercept, β a matching K × 1 vector of regression
coefficients, and it an error term. In stacked form, the simple pooled regression can be written as
y = xβ + , (1.2)
with y a NT × 1 vector, X a NT × K matrix and  a NT × 1 vector. In general, spatial dependence
is present whenever the correlation across cross-sectional units is non-zero, and the pattern of non-
zero correlations conforms to a specified neighbor relation. When the spatial correlation pertains
5to the dependent variable it is known as a spatial lag model. The neighbor relation is expressed by
means of a spatial weight matrix.
A spatial weights matrix W is a N × N positive matrix in which the rows and columns corre-
spond to the cross-sectional observations. An element wi j of the matrix expresses the prior strength
of the interaction between location i (in the row of the matrix) and location j (column). This can
be interpreted as the presence and strength of a link between nodes (the observations) in a network
representation that matches the spatial weights structure. In the simplest case, the weights matrix
is binary, with wi j = 1 when i and j are neighbors, and wi j = 0 when they are not. The choice
of the weights is typically driven by geographic criteria such as contiguity (sharing a common
border) or distance. However, generalizations that incorporate notions of “economic” distance are
increasingly being used as well. By convention, the diagonal elements wii = 0 . For computational
simplicity and to aid the interpretation of the spatial variables, the weights are almost always stan-
dardized such that the elements in each row sum to 1, or, wsi j = wi j/
∑
j wi j. Using the subscript
to designate the matrix dimension, with WN as the weights for the cross-sectional dimension, and
the observations stacked, the full NT × NT weights matrix becomes: WNT = IT ⊗WN , with IT an
identity matrix of dimension T .
Unlike the time series case, where “neighboring” observations are directly incorporated into a
model specification through a shift operator (example t−1), in the spatial literature the neighboring
observations are included in the model specification by applying a spatial lag operator (W) to the
dependent variable. A spatial lag operator constructs a new variable which consists of the weighted
average of the neighboring observations, with the weights as specified in W. The spatial lag model
or mixed regressive spatial autoregressive model includes a spatially lagged dependent variable as
an explanatory variable in the regression specification. The word “spatial lag” is used to specify the
inclusion of the neighboring observations. Similar to time series “lag operator”, Wy emphasizes
the first-order location lag in the dependent variable. The spatial lag model can be written as
y = ρ(IT ⊗WN)y + Xβ +  (1.3)
6where ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter, and the parameter of interest in this chapter.
1.2.1 Endogeneity Problem
The problem in the estimation of the model (1.3) is that, unlike the time series case, the spatial lag
term is endogenous. This is the result of the two-directionality of the neighbor relation in space (“I
am my neighbor’s neighbor”), in contrast to the one-directionality in time dependence. Rewriting
equation (1.3) in a reduced form:
y = [IT ⊗ (IN − ρWN)−1]Xβ + [IT ⊗ (IN − ρWN)−1] (1.4)
indicating that the joint determination of the values of the dependent variable in the spatial system
is a function of the explanatory variables and error terms at all locations in the system. The presence
of the spatially lagged errors in the reduced form illustrates the joint dependence of WNyt and t in
each cross-section. In model estimation, the simultaneity is usually accounted for through instru-
mentation (IV and GMM estimation) or by specifying a complete distributional model (maximum
likelihood estimation). In this chapter, we use maximum likelihood estimation.
1.2.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Assuming a Gaussian distribution for the error term, with  ∼ N(0, σ2 INT ), the log-likelihood can
be written as:
lnL = −NT
2
ln2piσ2 + Tln|IN − ρWN | −
1
2σ2
′ (1.5)
where  = y − ρ(IT ⊗ WN)y − Xβ and |IT ⊗ (IN − ρWN)| = Tln|IN − ρWN | is the Jacobian of the
spatial transformation. To avoid singularity or explosive processes, the parameter space P for the
true spatial autoregressive parameter ρ is compact and ρ0 is in the interior of P.
Lee [2004] discusses the asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimators for the
cross-section case. Lee and Yu [2010] and Yu et al. [2008] derive the properties for the spatial panel
model with fixed effects. We use the properties of the maximum likelihood estimators to derive the
asymptotic distribution of the test statistic.
71.3 Motivation
We consider the following model in a spatial lag model:
yit =

xitβ + ρ1
N∑
j=1
wi jy jt + it for t = 1, ..., ko,
xitβ + ρ2
N∑
j=1
wi jy jt + it for t = ko + 1, ...,T
(1.6)
ρ1 , ρ2 means there is a change at an unknown date k0. We propose a sup LR test of the null
hypothesis of ρ1 = ρ2 against the alternative hypothesis of a change: ρ1 , ρ2. The test detects a
structural break in the spatial dependence parameter. Following are some empirical models where
the test can be applied, providing motivation for the test.
1.3.1 Sectoral Output
Acemoglu et al. [2012] look into the intersectoral input-output linkages in the US and show how
microeconomic idiosyncratic fluctuations lead to aggregate fluctuations. Defining the sectoral pro-
duction function as,
xi = zilαi
n∏
j=1
xβwi ji j (1.7)
where xi is the output of sector i, li is the amount of labor hired by the sector, α ∈ (0,1) is the
share of labor, xi j is the amount of commodity j used in the production of good i, and zi is the
idiosyncratic productivity shock to sector i. The exponent wi j ≥ 0 designates the share of good j
in the total intermediate input use of firms in sector i. In particular, wi j = 0 if sector i does not use
good j as input for production.
Acemoglu et al. [2012] assume that the input shares of all sectors add up to 1, so
∑
j wi j = 1.
With the assumption of market clearing, equation (1.7) can be rewritten (taking log on both sides)
as equation (1.3). In this case, labor will be an exogenous variable and β1 , β2 would mean changes
in the Cobb-Douglas parameter over time.
81.3.2 Cigarette Sales
Baltagi and Li [2004] estimate a demand model for cigarettes based on a panel from 46 US states
and defining W based on the neighboring states:
log(Cit) = β1log(Pit) + β2log(Yit) + ρ
N∑
j=1
wi jlog(C jt) + it (1.8)
where Cit is real per capita sales of cigarettes by persons of smoking age (14 years and older). This
is measured in packs of cigarettes per capita. Pit is the average retail price of a pack of cigarettes
measured in real terms. Yit is real per capita disposable income. The spatial autocorrelation param-
eter shows the dependence of cigarette sales in the neighboring states. The tax policy on per packet
cigarette differs by states and this leads to substantial cross-state sales. However, over time, tax per
packet has become more homogeneous and hence one could expect the parameter ρ to change over
time. By testing the hypothesis that ρ1 = ρ2 against the alternative hypothesis of ρ1 , ρ2, we can
check if the dependence on neighboring states has changed over time.
1.3.3 Budget Spillovers
Case et al. [1993] showed that US states’ budget expenditure depends on the spending of similar
states:
Git = Xitβ + ρ
N∑
j=1
wi jG jt + it (1.9)
where Git is the per capita real government expenditure of state i in year t, Xit includes relevant
control variables-income and demographic, wi j > 0 if a state is the “neighbor” of another state. Case
et al. [1993] define “neighbor” in three different ways in their paper - 1) neighbors in location, 2)
states having similar income and 3) states having similar racial composition. They found that if
the neighboring state increases its budget spending by a dollar, then the state increases its budget
expenditure by 70 cents. Policies have changed over the years and one might be interested in testing
if the spillover effect remains the same.
91.3.4 Other Network Motivations
In many of the network studies, the impact of the network is usually estimated by including WY
in the model, where W is the weighting matrix defining the network and y is the variable of con-
cern. For example, a weighted average of the math test scores of students sitting beside student i
determines student i’s test score.
With increasing network data availability, we could have repeated samples from such network
experiments and then be curious to know how the impact of the network changes over time. Our
structural break test could be used in this respect.
1.4 Test
In this section, we describe the test statistic. The spatial lag model is given by:
yit = xitβt + ρt
N∑
j=1
wi jy jt + it (1.10)
where it ∼ N(0, σ2it). We want to test the null hypothesis:
H0 : ρ1 = .... = ρT and β1 = ... = βT and σ2i1 = ... = σ
2
iT
against the alternative
H1 : β1 = ... = βT and σ2i1 = ... = σ
2
iT but there is an integer k0, 1 < k0 < T ,
such that ρ1 = .... = ρk0 , ρk0+1 = .... = ρT .
Rewriting the panel model with a change point at k0 in the parameter ρ,
yit =

xitβ + ρ1
N∑
j=1
wi jy jt + it for t = 1, ..., ko,
xitβ + ρ2
N∑
j=1
wi jy jt + it for t = ko + 1, ...,T
(1.11)
where ρ1 , ρ2 means there is a change at an unknown date k0. The problem can be described as
testing ρ1 = ρ2 against ρ1 , ρ2.
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Let us write twice the likelihood ratio as
2Λk = 2(lnLk(ρˆk, βˆk, σˆ2k) + lnL
∗
k(ρˆ
∗
k, βˆk, σˆ
2
k) − lnLT (ρˆT , βˆT , σˆ2T )), (1.12)
where
• lnLk(ρˆk, βˆk, σˆ2k) is the log-likelihood defined for the sample that includes the observations t
= 1,..,k
• lnL∗k(ρˆ∗k, βˆk, σˆ2k) is the log-likelihood defined for the sample that includes the observations t
= k+1,...,T
• lnLT (ρˆT , βˆT , σˆ2T ) is the log-likelihood defined for the sample that includes the observations t
=1,...,T
As k0 is unknown, we use a maximally selected likelihood ratio and reject H0 if
Zt = max
[Tu]≤k≤[T (1−u)]
2Λk (1.13)
is large, where 0 < u < 1/2, typically a small number, is the trimming and [.] denotes the largest
integer that is less than or equal to the argument. So the suggested test is to calculate the difference
between the log-likelihood under an alternative hypothesis and the log-likelihood under null for
every [Tu] ≤ k ≤ [T (1 − u)] and then the test statistic is the maximum difference between them.
1.5 Limiting Distribution
In this section we derive the asymptotic distribution of the test statistic. However, before that we
specify the assumptions.
1.5.1 Assumptions
Assumptions on WN :
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Assumption 1. wi j ≥ 0, i , j for the off-diagonal elements of the spatial weight matrix WN and
its diagonal elements satisfy wn,ii = 0 for i = 1,..,N.
Assumption 2. WN is uniformly bounded in both row and column sums.
Assumption 3. |IT ⊗ (IN − ρWN)| is invertible for all ρ ∈ P; moreover, P is compact and ρ0 is in
the interior of P.
Assumptions on X and :
Assumption 4. it are iid across i and t with  ∼ N(0, σ2 INT ) and E|it|4+η < ∞ for some η > 0.
Assumption 5. The matrices 1N j
∑N
i=1
∑ j
t=1 XitX
′
it and
1
N j
∑N
i=1
∑T
t= j+1 XitX
′
it have minimum eigen-
values bounded away from zero in probability for large j. Also, it is assumed that E||X4it|| < ∞.
Assumption on N and T:
Assumption 6. N is a non-decreasing function of T and T → ∞
The following assumption is made to establish the theoretical result of the chapter.
Assumption 7. Let GN = WN[IN − ρNWN]−1 and 1√N (GN XNtβ0)′ = HNt then HNt ⇒ H∗ and
1
NT (GN XNtβ0)
′(GN XNtβ0)⇒ H∗′H∗.
Assumption 1 is a standard normalization assumption in spatial econometrics while Assump-
tion 2 is also used in Lee [2004] and Yu et al. [2008]. Assumption 3 guarantees that model (4)
is valid. Also, compactness is a condition for the theoretical analysis. In empirical applications,
where WN is row-normalized, one just searches over (-1,1). Assumption 4 provides regularity as-
sumptions for it. The likelihood function is obtained by assuming normally distributed errors.
However the limit distribution does not depend on this assumption. The result is based on quasi-
maximum likelihood estimates (QMLE). Assumption 5 makes sure that the regressors are asymp-
totically stationary. Assumption 6 allows two cases: (i) N → ∞ as T → ∞ such that NT → k < ∞,
for k ≥ 0 and (ii) N is fixed as T → ∞.
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Theorem. Let =⇒ denote weak convergence in distribution under the Skorohod topology. Under
assumptions 1-6 and H0, the limiting distribution of Zt is
Zt =⇒ sup
s∈(u,1−u)
B21(s)
s(1 − s) (1.14)
where B1(s), is a standard Brownian bridge and u, the trimming parameter is a small positive
number.
For a known break k0
Zt
D−→ χ2(1) (1.15)
To prove the result, we first take a Taylor approximation of 2Λk around the true parameter
ρ0. It is found that the approximations involve partial sums of Gaussian random vectors that are
independently and identically distributed. Using results from the maximum likelihood estimation
of the Spatial panel model we obtain uniform convergence to Weiner processes. As a next step,
the partials sums are manipulated to obtain a Brownian bridge distribution. For a fixed k, it is then
easy to show that the asymptotic distribution is Chi-Square. The detailed proof is provided in the
Appendix.
The intuition as to why the asymptotic distribution from the univariate time series test (Cso¨rgo¨
and Horva´th [1997]) is still valid in this case is because the spatial dependence is contained in
time, the dependent variable of unit i only depends on the contemporaneous dependent variable of
the neighboring units. So the endogeneity does not spread over time and hence the distribution is
similar to the one found in the univariate time series case.
There is an explicit form of the distribution function of the limit random variable. The critical
values are provided in Kiefer [1959], p.438. Some of the relevant critical values are for size = 10%,
1.4978; for size = 5%, 1.8444 and for size = 1% it is 2.649 for a 5% trimming.
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1.6 Estimation
Following evidence against null hypothesis, it is important to determine the location of the break
date. The proposed estimator of the break date is the one that maximizes the likelihood under the
alternative hypothesis,
kˆ = arg max
k
lnLA (1.16)
where lnLA is the log likelihood under the alternative defined as: lnLA = lnLk + lnL∗k where
lnLk = −Nk2 ln2piσ
2
 + kln|IN − ρWN | −
1
2σ2
N∑
i=1
k∑
t=1
itit
lnL∗k = −
N(T − k)
2
ln2piσ2 + (T − k)ln|IN − ρWN | −
1
2σ2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=k+1
itit
where lnLk is the log-likelihood defined for t = 1,..,k and lnL∗k is the log-likelihood for the sample
that includes the observations t = k+1,...,T
The asymptotic properties of the estimator, including the consistency, rate of convergence,
and limit distribution are currently under investigation. Simulation evidence, presented is section
7, shows that the estimator performs very well in small samples in terms of bias and root mean
squared error. The root mean squared error is shown to decrease as the sample size increases,
thereby suggesting that the estimator is indeed consistent.
1.7 Monte Carlo Results
To evaluate the finite sample performance of the LR test and the performance of the estimator, this
section reports results of a limited set of sampling experiments. All results reported are for 1000
simulations. I consider the data generating process:
yit =

1 + xit + 0.6
N∑
j=1
wi jy jt + it pre-break
1 + xit + ρ2
N∑
j=1
wi jy jt + it post-break
(1.17)
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where xit from N(0, 1) and it from N(0, 1.3).
We first look into the power of the proposed test. Let ρ1 = 0.6 and the actual break date is
k0 = T/2 in each of the cases. We find that the test has high power even with N and T = 50 as seen
in Table 1.1. The power increases with increases in N and / or T (see Table 1.2).
Table 1.1: Power of the test- I
N T Rho2 Frequency of rejection
50 50 0.7 0.957
50 50 0.65 0.337
50 50 0.55 0.263
50 50 0.5 0.807
50 50 -0.6 1
Table 1.2: Power of the test - II
N T Rho2 Frequency of rejection
50 100 0.65 0.657
50 100 0.55 0.551
50 200 0.65 0.932
50 200 0.55 0.881
100 50 0.65 0.515
100 50 0.55 0.401
100 100 0.65 0.852
100 100 0.55 0.741
100 200 0.65 0.989
100 200 0.55 0.971
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(a) N = 50, T= 50 (b) N = 200, T = 200
(c) N = 50, T = 500 (d) N = 500, T= 500
Figure 1.1: Emprical versus Asymptotic Distribution of the test
Next we look into graphical comparisons between empirical and asymptotic distributions of the
test presented in Figure 1.1. The continuous lines are the asymptotic distributions and the dotted
lines are the empirical cdf. It is found, that even with a small T, there is no size distortion and
the empirical distribution matches closely the asymptotic distribution. As T increases, the two
distributions overlap.
For a known break date, the asymptotic distribution is chi-square with 1 degree of freedom. The
graphical comparison presented in Figure 1.2 shows that even with N= 50, T= 50, with a known
break date, the empirical distribution is very close to the asymptotic chi-square distribution.
16
Figure 1.2: CDF plot for empirical distribution with a known break
Next we compare the performance of the break-date estimator. The bias is almost negligible.
The root mean square decreases with increases in N. With increases in T the standard deviation
does not go down. This is a well known result in the univariate time series literature-only the break
fraction can be consistently estimated, not the break date.
Also, we make a quick comparison with the ordinary least squares residuals-based method,
with the estimator defined by
kˆ = arg min
1≤k≤T
S S R(k) (1.18)
Here S S R(k) is the sum of squared residuals of the model under the alternative assuming a
break at date k. The bias is comparable in the two cases, but the standard deviation and root mean
square is higher for the OLS residual-based estimate of break date.
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Table 1.3: Estimator Performance - Likelihood Method
Rho1 Rho2 N T Break date bias St.dev RMSE
0.6 0.7 50 50 25 0.1 1.01 1.01
0.6 0.7 50 100 50 0.08 1.16 1.16
0.6 0.7 50 200 100 0.11 1.1 1.1
0.6 0.7 50 50 25 0.1 1.01 1.01
0.6 0.7 100 50 25 0.04 0.67 0.67
0.6 0.7 200 50 25 0.01 0.23 0.23
0.6 0.7 50 50 25 0.1 1.01 1.01
0.6 0.7 100 100 50 0.06 0.52 0.53
0.6 0.65 50 50 25 0.35 5.77 5.78
0.6 0.55 50 50 25 0.16 6.99 6.99
0.6 -0.6 50 50 25 0 0 0
Looking at the tables closely, an interesting pattern is observed, there is an asymmetry in the
behavior of the estimator and the power of the test. When ρ2 = 0.55 the power of the test is lower
compared to that when ρ2 = 0.65. Similarly the break date estimator has a lower standard deviation
and root mean square when the post-break parameter is increasing (ρ2 = 0.65) as compared to a
comparable reduction in the post-break parameter (ρ2 = 0.55). An explanation for such behavior
could be that, when post-break parameter is increasing (ρ2 = 0.65), there is a higher signal of
spatial dependence. This leads to reduction in the variance and makes it easier to assess whether
a break is present and locate it. However when the post-break parameter is comparably lower
(ρ2 = 0.55) the signal is lower giving rise to more variation and making it more difficult to assess
whether a break is present and locate it.
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Table 1.4: Estimator Performance - OLS Residuals
rho1 rho2 N T Break date bias St.dev RMSE
0.6 0.7 50 50 25 -0.2 2.53 2.54
0.6 0.7 50 100 50 -0.31 2.01 2.03
0.6 0.7 50 200 100 -0.36 1.85 1.88
0.6 0.7 50 50 25 -0.2 2.53 2.54
0.6 0.7 100 50 25 -0.14 1.17 1.18
0.6 0.7 200 50 25 -0.09 0.49 0.5
0.6 0.7 50 50 25 -0.2 2.53 2.54
0.6 0.7 100 100 50 -0.22 1.09 1.11
0.6 0.65 50 50 25 -0.51 8.95 8.96
0.6 0.55 50 50 25 -0.03 9.8 9.8
0.6 -0.6 50 50 25 0 0 0
The proposed likelihood based estimator performs well in finite sample. As N increases, the
root mean square error decreases suggesting that the estimator is consistent.
1.8 Budget Spillovers
Case et al. [1993] showed how a US state’s budget expenditure depends on the spending of simi-
lar states. Quoting Arkansas state Senator Doug Brandon (1989) describing his state’s budgetary
policy as
“We do everything everyone else does.”
The proposed sup LR test is used to check the hypothesis that a state’s dependence on another’s
budget remained the same in the US or has changed over time. The data consists of an annual
panel of US states from 1960 to 2011. All dollar figures are calculated on a per capita basis
and deflated using the GDP deflator (the base year being 2009). The dependent variable is the
government expenditure of state i in the year t. The budget expenditure is the sum of the direct
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spending of state and local governments. The variables included in Xit other than the intercept
are: the real per-capita personal income, income squared, real per capita total intergovernmental
federal revenue to state and local governments, population density, proportion of the population
at least 65 years old, proportion of the population between 5 and 14 years old, and proportion
of the population that is black. The income and revenue are the resources the state government
can use. The square of the income picks up possible non-linear effects of changing resources.
The population density captures the possibility that there are potential congestion effects and scale
economies in the provision of state and local government services. States with different age and
racial structures may have different demands for publicly provided goods. Hence demographic
variables are included.
The model can be written as:
Git = Xitβ + ρ
N∑
j=1
wi jG jt + it (1.19)
where X includes all the control variables. We consider T= 52 from 1960 to 2011 and N = 49
states in the US. Case et al. [1993] use three different ways to define the weight matrix. We define
the elements of the weight matrix as wi j = (1/|Yi − Y j|)/S i, where Yk is the mean income over the
sample period and S i is the sum
∑
j 1/|Yi − Y j|. According to this definition of the weight matrix,
rich states are neighbors to rich states and poor states are neighbors to poor states.
20
Table 1.5: Full model estimate
Coefficient Asymptotic t-stat p-value
intercept 0.697432 0.214295 0.830317
Pop65 -0.404178 -4.898872 0.000001
Pop5to14 -0.058942 -0.57394 0.566009
Popblack -0.056243 -4.30405 0.000017
Popden -0.000282 -2.213868 0.026838
F 1.735213 58.255465 0
Y 0.130133 14.288976 0
Y2 0.000018 1.621974 0.104809
W ∗G 0.121999 7.302404 0
All the test results are based on tests with size 5%. We reject the null hypothesis of no break,
implying evidence for a break. The break date is estimated at 1982. The pre-break budget spillover
coefficient is estimated as 0.0229 while the post-break budget spillover coefficient is estimated
as 0.1056. As to why there might be a break, there could be two reasons: 1) In 1981, Ronald
Reagan became the president of the United States and advocated many different policies across US
states (also known as Reagonomics). 2) The number of Democratic governors in the US started
decreasing post 1983 suggesting synchronized Republican economic policies in different states.
To differentiate between trend behaviors and fluctuations, a Hodrick-Prescott filter is applied
on all the dollar value variables to closely look into idiosyncratic budget spillovers in US states.
We reject the null hypothesis of no break. The break date is then estimated to be in 1977. The pre-
break ρ coefficient is 0.5718 and the post-break ρ coefficient is 0.3746. Firstly this suggests that
the idiosyncrasy in budget expenditure for a state depends on “similarly” situated states. Secondly,
the dependence goes down post-break. This can be attributed to more power given to the governors
in the 1980’s. For the federal government (central planner) the budget policies for each state will
be similar; compared to individual governors in each state who will adjust the budget expenditures
for their states based on individual needs. So overall even though the spillovers increase (capturing
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overall trend in the economy), the budget spillovers in case of idiosyncracies reduce over time.
1.9 Conclusion
We consider the problem of structural break in the spatial dependence parameter in a panel model
and provides a likelihood ratio test.
We first describe the spatial panel model and the interpretation of the spatial lag or spatial
autoregressive parameter. Next we motivate the problem of structural break in such parameter. The
sup LR test statistic is proposed and under large T, the limiting distribution is derived. The test is
easy to implement and the critical values can be analytically obtained.
In case there is evidence to reject the null hypothesis, we propose a break date estimator based
on the argument which maximizes the likelihood ratio. The finite sample properties of the test and
the break-date estimator are provided. The Monte Carlo simulations show that the test has good
power even in small samples. The estimator of the break date shows negligible bias and the root
mean square decreases with increases in N suggesting a consistent break-date estimator for a panel
model.
We then consider the problem of budget spillovers across US states and the change in the spatial
dependence over time. The test rejects the null hypothesis of no break in budget spillovers for 1)
the spillover in the overall budget expenditure of US states and 2) the spillover in the fluctuations
of budget expenditure. The overall trend of spatial dependence in budget expenditure is found to
have increased post-break, but the idiosyncrasies in budget expenditure are less spatially dependent
post-break.
The following extensions to the chapter are being considered - 1) asymptotic limit distribution
of the test staitstic for large N, (2) proving the consistency of the break date estimator and deriving
the limiting distribution, and 3) extending the test to multiple structural breaks.
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1.10 Appendix: Proof of theorem
Let θ = (ρ, β, σ2 ). Then,
lnLT (θ) = −NT2 ln2piσ
2
 + Tln|IN − ρWN | −
1
2σ2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
′itit
lnLk(θ) = −Nk2 ln2piσ
2
 + kln|IN − ρWN | −
1
2σ2
N∑
i=1
k∑
t=1
′itit
lnL∗k(θ) = −
N(T − k)
2
ln2piσ2 + (T − k)ln|IN − ρWN | −
1
2σ2
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=k+1
′itit
Denoting lnLT (θ) = Lc, lnLk(θ) = L1 and lnL∗k(θ) = L2. Also defining ρˆk as the MLE estimate
for the pre-break regime under the alternative, ρˆ∗k as the MLE estimate for the post-break regime
under the alternative and ρˆT as the MLE estimate under the null. Taking a Taylor expansion of
2[L1 + L2 − Lc] around the true value ρ0 and denoting that by Rk
Rk = 2[L1(ρ0) + L2(ρ0) − Lc(ρ0)
+ L′1(ρ0)(ρˆk − ρ0) +
L′′1 (ρ0)
2
(ρˆk − ρ0)2
+ L′2(ρ0)(ρˆ
∗
k − ρ0) +
L′′2 (ρ0)
2
(ρˆ∗k − ρ0)2
− L′c(ρ0)(ρˆT − ρ0) +
L′′c (ρ0)
2
(ρˆT − ρ0)2] + op(1)
Now, L1(ρ0) + L2(ρ0) = Lc(ρ0). So Rk can be rewritten as:
Rk = [2L′1(ρ0)(ρˆk − ρ0) + L′′1 (ρ0)(ρˆk − ρ0)2
+ 2L′2(ρ0)(ρˆ
∗
k − ρ0) + L′′2 (ρ0)(ρˆ∗k − ρ0)2
− 2L′c(ρ0)(ρˆT − ρ0) + L′′c (ρ0)(ρˆT − ρ0)2] + op(1)
From Lee [2004] and Yu et al. [2008] under the assumptions 1-6
√
NT (ρˆT − ρ0) = [ − 1NT L′′c (ρ0)]−1 1√NT L′c(ρ0) + op(1)
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√
Nk(ρˆk − ρ0) = [ − 1Nk L′′1 (ρ0)]−1 1√Nk L′1(ρ0) + op(1)√
N(T − k)(ρˆ∗k − ρ0) =
[ − 1
N(T − k) L
′′
2 (ρ0)
]−1 1√
N(T − k) L
′
2(ρ0) + op(1)
Using these relationships and rearranging the terms, Rk can be rewritten as:
Rk =
1√
Nk
L′1(ρ0)
[ − 1
Nk
L′′1 (ρ0)
]−1 1√
Nk
L′1(ρ0)
+
1√
N(T − k) L
′
2(ρ0)
[ − 1
N(T − k) L
′′
2 (ρ0)
]−1 1√
N(T − k) L
′
2(ρ0)
− 1√
NT
L′c(ρ0)
[ − 1
NT
L′′c (ρ0)
]−1 1√
NT
L′c(ρ0) + op(1)
Let GN = WN[IN − ρNWN]−1 then
− 1
NT
L′′c (ρ0) =
1
σ2
0
T∑
t=1
(
(WNYNt)WNYNt + tr(G2N)
)
+ op(1)
where WNYNt = GN XNtβ0 + GNNt.
Let, 1√
N
(GN XNtβ0)′ = HNt. Then by assumption 7, HNt ⇒ H∗ and
− 1NT L′′c (ρ0) = 1NT (GN XNtβ0)′(GN XNtβ0)⇒ H∗
′
H∗.
Also,
1√
NT
L′c(ρ0) =
1
σ2
0
√
NT
T∑
t=1
[
(GN XNtβ0)′Nt
]
+
1
σ2
0
√
NT
T∑
t=1
[
′NtG
′
NNt − σ20trGN
]
+ op(1)
1√
NT
T∑
t=1
[
′NtG
′
NNt − σ20trGN
]
= op(1)
1√
NT
T∑
t=1
[
(GN XNtβ0)′Nt
]
= Op(1)
Now, 1√
T
∑T
t=1
[ 1√
N
(GN XNtβ0)′Nt
]
= T−1/2
∑T
t=1 HNtNt. As T → ∞, by the FCLT we get:
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1√
T
T∑
t=1
HNtNt ⇒ H∗W(1)
where W(t) is a standard Weiner process. Thus, if we let lim
T→∞
k
T = λ. Then by the FCLT,
1√
k
k∑
t=1
HNtNt ⇒ H
∗W(λ)√
λ
1√
T − k
T∑
t=k+1
HNtNt ⇒ H
∗(W(1) −W(λ))√
1 − λ
Hence we get:
Rk ⇒ H
∗W(λ)(H∗)−1√
λ
H∗W(λ)(H∗)−1√
λ
+
H∗(W(1) −W(λ))(H∗)−1√
1 − λ
H∗(W(1) −W(λ))(H∗)−1√
1 − λ
− H∗W(1)(H∗)−1H∗W(1)(H∗)−1
Let
R(λ) ≡ 1
λ
[W(λ)]2 +
1
1 − λ [W(1) −W(λ)]
2 − [W(1)]2 = [λW(1) −W(λ)]
2
λ(1 − λ)
Rearranging the terms we get:
sup
λ∈(u,1−u)
Rk ⇒ sup
λ∈(u,1−u)
R(λ)
or sup
λ∈(u,1−u)
Rk ⇒ sup
λ∈(u,1−u)
B21(λ)
λ(1 − λ)
where B1(λ) = [λW(1) −W(λ)] is a Brownian Bridge.
For known k0, λ0 =
k0
T , the limit distribution of R(λ0) is χ
2
1.
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Chapter 2
Economic incentives versus institutional frictions: dynamics of cross-country
migration (with Anindya S. Chakrabarti)
In this chapter we devise a theory of cross-country migration in the form of labor mobility based on
regional and sectoral productivity shocks in a multi-country, multi-sector setting. Country-specific
sociological and institutional factors induce a friction on such labor reallocation process driven
by economic incentives. We use country level data to show how country to country migration
can be determined by industrial composition in the countries, shocks in factor productivity in the
regionally concentrated sectors and spatial dispersion of these shocks. The model explains both the
nominal and relative flow of workers across U.S. well, which is taken as the frictionless benchmark
case. On the other hand, when applied to Europe the model explains the relative flow network well,
but predicts a higher nominal flow than is seen in the data indicating a missing mass of migrants.
We use dyad regression to analyze the effects of institutional distance, which broadly captures the
socio-cultural differences between countries to explain the lack of cross-country labor mobility. We
show that lingual differences explain most of the ‘European immobility puzzle’.
And the Lord said, “Indeed the people are one and they all have one language, and this
is what they begin to do; now nothing that they propose to do will be withheld from
them.
Come, let Us go down and there confuse their language, that they may not understand
one anothers speech.”
So the Lord scattered them abroad from there over the face of all the earth . . .
-Genesis 11:49 (Tower of Babel)
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2.1 Introduction
The basic question we ask in this chapter is why do people migrate and how does socio-cultural
barriers cause an impediment in the process? Migration is a fairly old phenomena. Across the
world, people move from place to place in search for better economic and social lives. Especially in
the current age of globalization, the world has seen an ever-increasing stock of people who live far
away from their native countries. The rapid improvement of the communication and transportation
technology along with the removal of legal and political barriers contributed to this increased flow
of people between countries. However, in multiple instances this process of labor relocation does
not work quite smoothly. To put some numbers to understand the magnitude of the problem,
consider the U.S. where the average flow of migrants across states was about 2% in the last 20
years1. However, in case of Europe this rate is in the order of 1/100-th of the corresponding value
for the U.S. This phenomenon is referred to in the literature as the ‘European immobility puzzle’
(see for example, Braunerhjelm et al. [2000]). An important policy question is what explains this
missing mass of migrants? The answer, as we will show later, lies in the differences of languages
more than other factors.
There are multiple reasons why people choose to migrate. Probably the most important motiva-
tion to migrate arises from purely economic factors e.g. higher wage or productivity in one country
vis-a-vis another (Kennan and Walker [2011], Bertoli et al. [2013]). Institutional factors also play
an important role in shaping the same decision-making process. For example, differences in lan-
guages, cultures or customs may present an impediment in the process (Belot and Ederveen [2012]).
Thus from a purely economic point of view, the phenomenon of migration between countries with
similar economic characteristics can be thought of as an adjustment process or a reallocation pro-
cess of labor resulting from asymmetric productivity shocks. However, various socio-cultural (or
political for that matter) factors can induce frictions on this process reducing the extent of the re-
allocation process. Ultimately, how the actual dynamics shapes up is a complex interplay between
such economic and sociological forces. Understanding of the mechanism underlying migration is
1This rate actually shows a secular decline over the same period as in 1990 the rate was about 3% and in 2011, the
rate is about 1.5% of the whole population (Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl [2013]).
27
of first-order importance as low levels of migration due to structural or institutional rigidities imply
less flexible labor market. Thus the economy if hit by negative spatial and/or sectoral shocks, will
take more time to adjust, prolonging the downturn. Batini et al. [2010] for example argues that
low inter-state migration was a potential cause of the slow recovery of the U.S. economy after the
2007-08 crisis. What makes it more compelling is that U.S. is found to be much more flexible in
terms of migration than Europe. Thus a similar downturn would be way more prolonged in Europe
with a far more rigid labor market, which the European Union largely wanted to avoid by allowing
free movement of labor. Therefore a decomposition of the effects of sheer economic force and
institutional factors is important to understand their relative effects on labor allocation.
Our primary target in this chapter is to explain the relative contributions of different economic
and institutional factors in determining the magnitude of migration across countries. These effects
are most prominently seen in case of Europe vis-a-vis U.S. These two political unions being ‘North’
have far less variation in economic conditions among the constituent states than a ‘North-South’
relationship like U.S. and India. Thus one might imagine such an union to comprise smaller states
sharing largely similar economic background (identical labor laws, integrated financial markets
etc.), connected to each other by economic linkages though trade and migration. If the constituent
states receive asymmetric productivity shocks, we would expect workers to flow from the low-
productivity state to high productivity state, in a friction-less world. Thus the process of migration
would manifest itself in two forms; first, there would be people migrating to-and-fro between all
pairs of states which gives us an idea about relative flow of workers between pairs of states and
second, the total mass of migrants i.e. the total mass of workers that were displaced due to the
realization of the productivity shocks. We construct a model consistent with the U.S. data in terms
of the labor network generated as well as the total mass of migrants. Then we show that the model
captures the labor network across Europe well but over-predicts the total mass of migrants. The
difference between the model and the data is explained by an array of various institutional factors,
lingual differences being the the most persistent one.
In the following, we first present an N-country, two-sector model augmented with sector and
country specific idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The basic inputs are capital and labor which we
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assume to be fixed and movable in the short-run, respectively. Labor being the only movable input,
in face of different cross-sectional realization of shocks, it would move across states according to
the relative attractiveness based on productivity. Thus from one set of labor allocation, we reach
another set such that utilities are equalized across the states restoring equilibrium. The underly-
ing logic is that migratory responses are ultimately utility enhancing2 (Ashby [2007]). Therefore
any friction not allowing free-movement of labor would reduce welfare. The analytical structure
provided by Caliendo et al. [2014] helps us to explicitly pin down the effects on labor allocation.
Assuming homogeneity of labor, we can construct a labor flow network by combining all pairs of
countries. Thus when the countries experience series of productivity shocks, we generate a labor
flow network resulting from the model as an equilibrium response to external perturbation. The
driving mechanisms behind migration are two-folds. The first one is a pure general equilibrium
channel which captures the labor flow as an outcome of sectoral reallocation process due to pro-
ductivity differences across sectors. The second one is the trade channel through which we quantify
the inter-country labor flow due to spill-over of productivity shocks due to the trade process. In
general, the essential mechanism can be thought of as a planner’s problem where the planner treats
(perfectly divisible) labor as a movable productive input and allocates it across countries according
to productivity shocks realized in different countries.
Broadly, we borrow from the recently blooming literature in international trade theory (in the
tradition of the celebrated Eaton and Kortum [2002] model) that combines a rich description of
the production processes thus capturing the propagation of shocks across the network along with
adjustable i.e. movable productive inputs. We show that a similarly specified model can serve as
a benchmark case for a frictionless world. With repeated shocks (calibrated to data) the model
generates an weighted and directed network3 of labor flow in the steady state that provides a
2Tiebout [1956] makes an interesting observation that with low rigidities in labor market and no asymmetries in
information or externalities induced by government, the consumers would reveal their preference through migration.
This idea of ‘voting with feet’ is found to have significant empirical support Banzhaf and Walsh [2008]. However, in the
current chapter we do not differentiate between the consumption bundles. Only factor productivity drives migration.
3A network is defined as a collection of edges and nodes. In our case, the countries/states are the modes and the
country-to-country labor flows constitute the edges. Since the mass of labor flowing between different pairs of countries
are different, we call the network weighted and since the inflow is not necessarily equal to outflow in terms of labor, we
call the network directed.
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micro-founded theory of multilateral gravity equation of migration. However, there are various
social-cultural-political-geographical factors working for and against this process which alters the
allocation and hence induces a sub-optimal outcome. Thus such frictions are associated with an
welfare loss. We augment the labor flow equations derived from the basic model with several types
of frictions to analyze their relative deterrence effects. The contiguity of the countries is seen to
induce a bigger flow in data compared to the model. On the other hand, distances in terms of
language and culture seems to deter migration. This finding captures the basic proposition of Be-
lot and Ederveen [2012]. With an enlarged database we also find other institutional factors like
financial and legal conditions affects migration.
This chapter is related to several streams of literature. On the theoretical dimension, the chapter
adopts the view that a joint description of the global economy (in the very specific context of current
problem i.e. Europe or the U.S.) is important to understand the mechanism underlying migration
as evidently the mass of migrants between two countries is influenced by the other countries that
are potential donors or receivers (as documented for example in Bertoli and Moraga [2013]). Thus
the most general description of the process would be in terms of a flow network which is both
weighted and directed signifying the differential mass of migrants migrating between different
pairs of countries as well as capturing the direction of movement. Joint evolution of sectors and
propagation of shocks in a interconnected economy and subsequent adjustments has been studied
extensively in the recent years (see for example, Acemoglu et al. [2012], Oberfield [2013], Foerster
et al. [2011]).
In particular, our model depends heavily on the structure laid down by Caliendo et al. [2014]
which shows that interregional trade propagates the disaggregated shocks to the rest of the econ-
omy. We borrow this idea of sector and region-specific TFP shocks and argue that the complex
structure of regional composition of industries and asymmetric TFP shocks in these industries lead
to migration. We create a network of regional and sectoral linkages which transmits the idiosyn-
cratic shocks throughout the economy. The framework is in turn, based on the international trade
literature in the tradition of the Eaton and Kortum [2002] and its subsequent modifications by
Alvarez and Lucas [2007]. We analyze the model in the steady state to pin down the labor flow net-
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work. Thus even though we borrow the methodology of trade theory and we explicitly calibrate the
model to match the trade characteristics of the data, for our purpose it only works as a medium of
propagation of shocks. More importantly, we recognize the role of various frictions in determining
the actual level of migration. Albeit different in scope, Redding et al. [2012] provides a theory of
structural change which can be interpreted as bilateral migration, based on a similar trade theoretic
structure. An expanded framework was used by Redding [2014] to study the welfare gains from
trade. As such the present contribution is an attempt to bridge the trade theoretic literature to the
labor migration literature (Goston and Nelson [2013]).
There is a huge empirical literature on migration and various factors that magnifies or lessens
it. Treyz et al. [1993] was as early attempt that considered a behavioral model of migration and
using time-series data showed that migration is affected, among others, by relative employment
opportunities, relative wages, industry composition and local amenities. In our theoretical model,
the first three effects have been explicitly taken care of and we consider a data set richer in scope
to pin down more disaggregated effects of various institutional factors. Klein and Ventura [2009]
constructs a growth model to study the welfare gains from removing barriers to migration as there
exists substantial productivity differences between the countries (see also Klein and Ventura [2007]
for the theoretical analysis of the dynamic model). However, they focus on the historical evolu-
tion of the migration pattern and study aggregated data. The effects of various types of frictions
have been studied in details. For example, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl [2013] studies the reason
behind the secular decline in U.S. interstate migration over the last two decades and finds reduced
geographic specificity and higher information about the states to be important factors. Even then,
U.S. interstate migration is far more prominent than Intra-Europe migration. Empirically, Palmer
and Pytlikova [2013] finds lax labor laws to be an attractive factor positively affecting intra-Europe
migration whereas Belot and Ederveen [2012] finds cultural differences to present an obstacle in
the same context. See Molloy et al. [2011] and Coen-Pirani [2010] for a detailed overview of
the interstate migration in U.S. Finally, Wang [2014] studied preferences of migrant workers for
multi-national corporations over other firms in the OECD countries. In the current formulation, we
do not address the preferences of worker over types of firms as that lies outside the scope of the
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present work.
2.2 A model of migration
In this section, our goal is to provide a model to capture annual bilateral migration between different
pairs of countries. We consider a model with T (finite) periods where each year N islands (N
countries belonging to the European Union or N states of U.S.) experiences idiosyncratic shocks
exactly T times and thee workers can move across the islands depending on the relative intensities
of the shocks. In the following, we will refer to both countries and states as ‘islands’ to avoid
confusion, unless explicitly mentioned. Each island is populated by a continuum of homogeneous
households. There are tradables and non-tradable final goods produced by firms in each island
for the consumption of the households. For fixing the notion, we assume manufacturing industry
constitutes the tradables and the service industry produces the non-tradables. Each of the final
goods producing industries also produces a continuum of intermediate goods using local labor and
a local fixed capital stock. This stock might be interpreted as the structures and land which does
not grow over time or at least, grows at a much slower pace than labor movement. The islands trade
on intermediate inputs. The final goods are only for consumption. The household supplies its labor
to both sectors in the home country.Since the islands have their idiosyncratic productivity shocks
process and labor is the only mobile factor, sector and island-specific productivity shocks will lead
to multi-lateral flow of labor across sectors and islands. This feature is obtained from the model
proposed by Caliendo et al. [2014]. The flow of workers from one island to another is interpreted
as migration.
2.2.1 Households’ problem
In each island a continuum of households constitutes the demand side. They are the sole suppliers
of labor which is used in the local production processes. There are two final goods, tradables
(M) and non-tradables(S ). As has been described above, we lump manufacturing industries to
constitutes the tradable sector and the service producing industries to constitute the non-tradable
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sector. The instantaneous utility function of households in the n-th island at a generic time-point t
is defined over consumption of the manufactured goods (CM) and service (CS ),
Unt = (CMnt )
α(CSnt)
(1−α), (2.1)
where α is the relative weight attached to manufactured goods. The budget constraint simply states
that the total expenditure of the manufactured goods and services has to be less than equal to
income. This can be written as
PMnt C
M
nt + P
S
ntC
S
nt ≤ Int, (2.2)
where the term on the right hand side denotes per-capita income which is the sum of rental income
earned from fixed capital stock (or structures and land as has been described in Caliendo et al.
[2014]) and wage. Lets us denote the interest rate by r, the island-specific fixed capital stock by K,
labor by L and wage rate by w. Thus we have the income equation,
Int = rnt
Knt
Lnt
+ wnt. (2.3)
The expected lifetime utility of an agent who over time migrates to a sequence of islands {n}1,...,T ,
is
UT = E
 T∑
t=1
Unt
 where Unt is given by Eqn. 2.1. (2.4)
In order to solve the model, we will assume that there is no uncertainty in the economy in the sense
that at every period, the agents first see the realized values of the factor productivity and then decide
where to move. However, given diminishing productivity of labor, the utility is equalized across
all islands to restore equilibrium ensuring an interior solution. This allows us to solve each period
separately as there is no dynamic trade-off. Therefore, we will drop the time index in the later
calculations with the implicit understanding that the solution holds true for every period. Clearly
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the consumption choice is given by
CMnt = α
Int
PMnt
and CSnt = (1 − α)
Int
PSnt
. (2.5)
By substituting the demand functions in the utility function, we can find out the indirect utility
function of households in one island as
Unt =
( α
PMnt
)α(1 − α
PSnt
)1−αInt,
=
Int
Pnt
, (2.6)
where Pnt is the standard ideal price index defined over the prices of sectoral goods as
Pnt =
(PMnt
α
)α( PSnt
1 − α
)1−α. (2.7)
Since the agents are free to move across the islands, in equilibrium we would have utility equalized
across the islands and hence,
Unt = U¯t. (2.8)
Note that utility has to be equalized across islands at every point of time, but not necessarily across
time. In other words, in general U¯t = U¯t′ for any t, t′ ≤ T . Thus the lifetime utility of an agent is
UT =
T∑
t=1
U¯t (2.9)
whatever be the sequence of islands she migrated to in her lifetime.
2.2.2 Supply side
The final goods (both manufactured goods and the service products) are used for consumption.
However, in each sector these goods (M and S ) are produced by a bundling technology which uses
a continuum of intermediate goods. These intermediates are in turn produced by combining local
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labor and capital stock. Note that as in Caliendo et al. [2014], we keep the trade channel open as
the final goods producing firms can buy intermediate goods from any island. Thus we can identify
the source of fluctuation in labor allocation through this channel.
2.2.2.1 Intermediates
Firms of both sectors j ∈ {M, S } in each island n, produces a continuum of varieties of intermediate
goods following an i.i.d. shock process, ξ jn and a deterministic productivity level Z
j
n. As in Caliendo
et al. [2014], the shock process ξ jn follows a Frechet distribution with shape parameter θ j. The
production functions for both sectors ( j ∈ {M, S }) are defined as
q jn = ξ
j
nZ
j
n(k
j
n)
β(l jn)
1−β, (2.10)
where lowercase letters l and k denote the demand for labor and capital respectively by a repre-
sentative firm, β being the relative weight assigned to capital. The shock process Z jn is assumed to
follow a random walk in logarithm that is, we assume that
Z jn(t + 1) = ψitZ
j
n(t) where ψi ∼ N(1, σi) and i ∈ {M, S }. (2.11)
The unit cost of production in each sector in island n can be found by minimizing
w jnl
j
n + r
j
nk
j
n, (2.12)
subject to
ξ
j
nZ
j
n(k
j
n)
β(l jn)
1−β = 1. (2.13)
Thus we can derive the unit cost as a function of the productivity levels and the input prices- wage
and rental rate,
c jn =
1
ξ
j
nZ
j
n
[β−β(1 − β)(1−β)]rβnw(1−β)n . (2.14)
Thus the firms would produce the variety as long as the price more than the unit cost c jn. Assuming
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perfect competition, price is exactly equal to the unit cost. For notational convenience, we lump
the terms in the unit cost function and denote them by
B = β−β(1 − β)(1−β) and ω jn = Brβnw(1−β)n . (2.15)
Let p jn denote the equilibrium price of two sectors ( j ∈ {M, S }) in the n-th island. Thus profit pi of
a firm producing intermediate goods in the j-th sector is simply given by total revenue minus wage
bill and rental payment,
pi
j
intermediates = p
j
nq
j
n − wnl jn − rnk jn. (2.16)
Thus at the optimal level the expenditures on labor and capital are (see Eqn. 2.10)
wnl
j
n = (1 − β)p jnq jn, (2.17)
rnk
j
n = βp
j
nq
j
n. (2.18)
2.2.2.2 Final goods
As has been described above, the final goods production in both sectors ( j ∈ {M, S }) is carried out
competitively using a bundling technology,
Q jn = [
∫
(q˜ jn(ξ
j))γ
j
nφ j(ξ j)dξ j]1/γ
j
n , (2.19)
where the i.i.d. productivity shocks on intermediate goods are distributed as
φM(ξM) = exp
( − N∑
n=1
(ξMn )
−θM ), (2.20)
φS (ξS ) = exp
( − (ξSn )−θS ), (2.21)
and q˜ is the optimally chosen level of production of the intermediate goods. Since intermediates for
manufactured goods are traded, the shocks are jointly distributed whereas for non-tradable service
sector, that is not the case. Thus the pattern of trade between the islands is incorporated in the
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above production functions in terms of intermediates.
Therefore in the n-th island, the profit of the final goods producers in both sectors ( j ∈ M, S )
are defined as total revenue from selling the final goods minus the cost of procuring and using the
intermediates,
pi
j
n, f inal = P
j
nQ
j
n −
∫
p jn(ξ
j)q˜ jn(ξ
j)φ jn(ξ
j)dξ j, (2.22)
where the final goods production function is given above (Eqn. 2.2.2.2). Clearly the optimal
demand for a particular type of intermediate good is given by
q˜ jn =
( p jn(ξ j)
P jn
)− 1
1−γ jn Q jn, (2.23)
which on substitution in the production function gives us the aggregate price level for the final good
as a function of prices of intermediates used in the production process,
P jn = [
∫ (
p jn(ξ
j)
) γ jn
γ
j
n−1 φ j(ξ j)dξ j]
γ
j
n−1
γ
j
n . (2.24)
Intuitively, this functional form of the aggregate pricing equation reflects the particular bundling
technology assumed in Eqn. .
2.2.2.3 Closing the model
Final goods are non-tradable in all sectors. Only the intermediates in the manufacturing sector M
are tradables. The cost of transportation from location n to i (in units of good produced in location
n) is given as
τMni ≥ 1,
τSni = ∞. (2.25)
For obvious reasons, we define τMnn = 1. Such a structure imposes a ice-berg cost on trans-
portation. Therefore, due to cost minimization the pricing equations for intermediates are given
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as
pMn = mini
(κMinωMi
ξMi Z
M
i
)
. (2.26)
Following Eaton and Kortum [2002], such a specification gives us
PMn = Γ( f
M
n )
γMn /(γ
M
n −1)[
N∑
i=1
[ωMi κ
M
in ]
−θM (ZMi )
θM ]−1/θ
M
, (2.27)
where Γ(.) denotes a gamma function and f Mn = 1 + (γ
M
n )/(θ
M(γMn − 1)) where γMn is the measure
of substitutability of intermediates in the production function of the final goods (see Eqn. 2.2.2.2).
On the other hand, the price index of the non-tradables is given as
PSn = Γ( f
S
n )
γMn /(γ
M
n −1)ωSn (ZSn )−1, (2.28)
where f Sn is defined analogously in terms of the measure of substitutability (γ
S
n ) in the production
of the service good. The labor market clearing holds at two levels. Within each island, total labor
must be equal to the sum of the sectoral allocation,
LMn + L
S
n = Ln ∀n ≤ N (2.29)
and at the aggregate level, total labor endowment must be equal to the sum of the geographical
distribution across islands, ∑
n
Ln = 1. (2.30)
Similarly for capital stock, we have regional market clearing
KMn + K
S
n = Kn ∀n ≤ N. (2.31)
Note that since capital is immobile, we do not have market clearing condition for capital at the
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aggregate level. Solving for labor allocation we get
Ln =
[ ωnPnU¯ ]
1/βKn∑
i[
ωi
PiU¯
]1/βKi
, (2.32)
where ωn is described in Eqn. 2.15.
2.2.2.4 Regional market clearing
Since final goods are only consumed (no investment opportunity), total consumption (Cn) by whole
population (Ln) must be equal to production(Qn) in both sectors j ∈ {M, S },
LnC
j
n = Q
j
n. (2.33)
In terms of expenditure X jn on the final goods in sector j in island n, we find
XMn = αInLn and X
S
n = (1 − α)InLn, (2.34)
where InLn is the total income and α is the weight on manufactured goods in the utility function
(see Eqn. 2.1). The intuition of this result is that due to the Cobb-Dauglas structure of the utility
function, the resultant expenditure is linear in aggregate nominal income (follows directly from
Eqn. 2.5).
Let us denote the total expenditure on intermediates bought by the n-th island from the i-th
island for producing j type final good ( j ∈ {M, S }) by X jni. Similarly, we denote the share of that
expenditure in the total revenue in the n-th island by pi jni. Since the zero-profit condition holds, total
cost must exhaust total revenue which in turn implies that the share
piMni =
XMni
XMn
=
(
Γ( f Mn )
γ/(1−γ) τ
M
niω
M
i
PMn ZMn
)−θM . (2.35)
Recall that for the non-tradables the transportation cost is infinite (τS = ∞) and hence, For the
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non-tradables,
piSnn = 1, (2.36)
which is almost tautological in the sense that the share of local production is unity in the production
of final goods in the non-tradables sector.
Let us introduce a hat notation here which simplifies the exposition of considerably. Define
xˆ =
xnew
xold
, (2.37)
which says that the ratio of the new and the old values of any variable x, is denoted by xˆ. This trick
is useful because as Caliendo et al. [2014] shows that the whole model can be solved in ratios of
the old and the new values of all variables rather than actually deriving the old and the new values
separately.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
Now we can define a competitive equilibrium. First, we define it for a static model which is
equivalent to assuming the time horizon T = 1. Given labor endowments {Ln} (we normalize
it so that L = 1) and the capital endowment {Kn}n, a competitive equilibrium is an utility level
U¯, factor prices {rn,wn}n, labor allocation {Ln}n, final goods expenditure {XMn , XSn }n, consumption
vector {cMn , cSn }n, prices of final goods {PMn , PSn }n and pairwise regional intermediate expenditure
share in every sector {piMn , piSn }n such that all markets clear in all islands n ∈ N.
In the dynamic case with T ≥ 1, we claim that under the equilibrium configuration, the above
defined static equilibrium would hold for each and every time period t. To see why that is true, we
can use backward induction. There are two crucial assumptions in the whole model that delivers
this result. One, there is no cost involved in migration and two, the workers decide to move after
they see the realized shocks. Now consider the penultimate period T − 1. When the productivity
shocks occur in the period T , depending on the relative intensities of the shocks the workers would
migrate. Thus from the perspective of period T − 1, there is no state dependence of the decision
that will be made in period T . In other words, it does not matter which island the worker belongs
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to to make a decision about period T . Therefore from the perspective of period T − 2, the island
where a particular worker is does not matter for the decision that will be made on period T − 1.
Extending the same argument, we see that right from period 1 the sequence of islands that a worker
travels, does not matter. Utilities are always equalized across islands in every period.
This is very helpful in solving the model as we can essentially solve for the labor allocation
in each period separately after realization of the productivity shocks specific to the island and the
sectors. Another implicit assumption plays an important role here. Note that we did not define
capital ownership explicitly. The underlying idea is that the government is the owner of all capital
stock within each island. The firms rent capital from the government who in turn distributes the
proceeds to the workers. Thus even if we do have repeated migration within these T periods i.e. the
same worker can come back to one particular island over and over again depending on productivity
shocks, we have no problem allowing that since the workers are not capital owners. In reality, we
do see a large amount of repeat migration which might relate to the issue of capital holding. For
example, Thom [2014] documents a large amount of repeat migration among workers and links it
to their savings behavior. In the present context, we chose to ignore it as it lies out of scope of our
work.
2.2.4 The effects of shocks
The above system of equations can be solved at every time point t after realization of the sequence
of sector and island specific shocks Zˆ jnt. Given a set of parameters {θ j, α, β}Nn, j={S ,M} and data for
{In, Ln, pi jni, Zˆ jn}N,Nn,i, j={S ,M} the system yields solution for {wˆn, Lˆn, Xˆ jn, Pˆ jn, X′ jn, pi′ jni}N,Nn,i, j={M,S } with the
hat notation denoting the ratio of the new value of a variable to that of the old value. From these
we can find out the changes in real prices and output along with utility {rˆn, pˆi jnn, Iˆ jn, ˆ¯U}Nn, j={M,S }.
2.2.5 The network of migration
Given the labor dynamics across countries, we are in a position to construct the labor mobility
network. Note that due to any TFP shock, all of the countries will face a fluctuation in the efficient
level of employment. Some countries will lose workers whereas others will gain.
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of flow of workers after realization of productivity shocks. Some coun-
tries are donor and others are receivers.
Since workers are assumed to be homogeneous both in terms of consumption pattern and labor
supply, they would show no particular preference for any country under the no-friction regime that
is when there is no friction opposing labor mobility. Recall that for the n-th country, the total
change is Lˆn. Therefore, total change for the n-th country is (Lˆn − 1)Ln. Thus one can write the
labor flow from the j-th country to the i-th country at time t as
Ftji =
 (Lˆ j − 1)L j∑
n∈Nout (Lˆn − 1)Ln
 (Lˆi − 1)Li, (2.38)
where Nout is the set of countries from which labor migrates to other countries and j ∈ Nout . The
above flow equation uses the fact that the labor is homogenous in that the inflow from a country j to
country i will be proportional to the contribution of country j relative to the total mass of displaced
workers. Note that one could alternatively write it as
Ftji = −
(
(Lˆi − 1)Li∑
n∈N in(Lˆn − 1)Ln
)
(Lˆ j − 1)L j, (2.39)
whereN in is the set of countries to which labor migrates from other countries. Evidently in absence
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of links to the rest of the world,
∑
i∈N in
(Lˆi − 1)Li = −
∑
j∈Nout
(Lˆ j − 1)L j, (2.40)
that is total inflow must be equal to total outflow.
With a single realization of a set of shocks across the sectors and the islands, there will be
donors and receivers. Those island that experienced relatively better shocks will be ranked higher
in relative attractiveness. Thus workers will migrate to the receivers. Therefore, at every point
of time such a set of shocks would generate a directed and weighted network of migrants. But
this network would be unidirectional in the sense that labor flow is always one-way between any
pair. However, with repeated shocks in the steady state, an island that was a net donor in one
period, may turn out to be a net receiver the next period. Thus in general over sufficient number
of time points (with large enough T ), we will generate bilateral flow for each and every possible
pairs of islands. Evidently the net flow (inflow-outflow) would be much smaller than the gross flow
(inflow+outflow). This is another characteristic of model that matches the data well, for example
in case of U.S. the gross flow is about 10 times larger than the net flow as has been documented in
Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl [2013].
2.3 Results
We calibrate the parameters (see Table 2.1 for the numerical values) of the theoretical model for
two sets of data. The first one is for 15 of the countries in the European Union and Norway. The
second one is for the states of U.S. In both cases, as mentioned earlier we will not be seeing any
‘South’ to ‘North’ kind of migration. The islands in both the cases have inherent homogeneity.
However, institutional frictions should be much clear in the EU countries. In the following, we
discuss the 2 datasets (U.S. and European countries) briefly and then compare the results from the
theoretical model with the real data. The shape parameters (of the shock distribution z) θ describe
competitiveness in production process. Its value is taken to be the average value of θ computed
in Eaton and Kortum [2002] which shows that it varies over a long range from 3.60 to 12.86. We
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have rounded the average value to the nearest digit to keep it simple. For the same value describing
the service sector, we chose a smaller value for it to indicate a higher range of heterogeneity in the
service sector. However, it does not really matter because in the current formulation, service goods
are not traded. Another important point is that while generating the shocks to the productivity Z,
we divided each shock by the length of the time horizon T to keep the system in the steady state.
Thus, for any i−th sector
ψit =
ψ˜it
T
where ψ˜ ∼ N(1, σ), (2.41)
so that
T∑
t
ψit =
T∑
t
ψ˜it
T
→ 1 for T → ∞. (2.42)
The values given are for U.S. For Europe only the standard deviation of the shocks differ as the
time-series of shocks are different in the European countries. However this does not change any-
thing qualitatively.
Table 2.1: Parameter values calibrated for simulation purpose (U.S.)
Description parameter value
Service goods’ share in cost 1-α 0.6
Capital share in cost β 0.3
Dispersion of shocks: Manufacturing θm 8
Dispersion of shocks: Service θs 2
Std. dev. of shocks: Manufacturing σM 0.0380
Std. dev. of shocks: Service σS 0.0057
Length of simulation T 200
# simulations averaged - O(10)
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2.3.1 The migration network of Europe
We look into migration data from 2000 to 2007 for 16 countries (see Sec. 2.7.1 for details on
sources of data) which gives us the full 16×16 migration matrix depicting the bilateral flow.. Our
objective is to build the complete matrix from the theoretical model and compare each element
with the data. However, there is incompleteness in the available data showing the bilateral flow of
labor as a few countries do not report the migration statistics at all, some countries stop reporting
after a period of time and some start only after a time point. So we extract the maximum amount
of data available and compare it with the results that the theoretical model provides.
Table 2.2: Descriptive summary for EU bilateral migration (16 countries)
Year Obesrvations Mean Std.Dev Min Max
2000 66 5056.924 8813.484 0 45439
2001 66 5231.076 9290.369 0 43375.5
2002 66 5377.379 9570.473 2 41312
2003 66 5203.114 9455.308 6 49670
2004 66 5608.924 10292.27 3 59337
2005 66 5830.758 10729.29 7 57652
2006 69 5239.217 10345.33 8 56612
2007 66 4307.53 7815.329 16 34417
To simulate the bilateral migration - driven by productivity shocks from the theoretical model
we use a block recursive algorithm (see Sec. 2.7.3). We use the parameter values described in
2.1, and provide the population data for the countries (Li; we normalize it so that
∑
i Li = 1), the
per-capita GDP and the bilateral trade relationship between countries (pim and pis) as inputs of the
model (see Sec. 2.7.3). Fig. 2.2 provides snapshot of the data for a single year, 2000. From the
right panel in Fig. 6 we can see that sectoral shocks are highly asymmetric across countries. To
capture this pattern, we estimate the degree of variation of the shocks across sectors.
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Figure 2.2: Data description for EU countries for the year 2000
We compare the theoretical results (referred to henceforth as TFP driven migration) with the
actual data of migration. In order to compare meaningfully, we consider the dyads for which actual
migration data is available (both mi j and m ji) and sum it up (mi j + m ji) to get rid of the direction
of migration and regress this on its theoretical counterpart, the TFP driven migration (theoretical
mi j + m ji).
From the model we get that due to TFP differences net migration in the 16 countries should be
around 2%. In the next table we regress the dyad specific bilateral migrations from actual data on
the TFP driven migration results (from theoretical model). Table 2.3 contains results of regressing
data on model-predicted migration. To do that we construct the l.h.s. variable as
yk =
mdatai j + m
data
ji∑
n Ldatan
. (2.43)
We normalize the migration flow by the total population so that we can talk about total flow of
migration in percentage terms. Similarly, we construct the regressor as
xk =
mmodeli j + m
model
ji∑
n Lmodeln
. (2.44)
Note that we already normalized the labor allocation in the model so that the denominator is 1. In
the regression we control for contiguity which is a dummy variable showing whether two countries
in a dyad shares a border or not.
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Table 2.3: Regression results for EU - Nominal
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept Adjusted R2
2000 0.05836∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.77380
2001 0.05870∗∗∗ 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.76270
2002 0.06118∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.77240
2003 0.05456∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.63560
2004 0.05709∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.58090
2005 0.06132∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.66860
2006 0.06376∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.68340
2007 0.06030∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.73690
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
We find from Table 2.3 that though the coefficient of TFP driven migration is much lower than
1 which should have been the case if the model match the data perfectly, but it is significant and in
each year the model has sufficiently high R2. This is an interesting finding as it basically suggests
that the total mass of migrants predicted by the model is much higher than what is seen in the
data. A legitimate question at this point would be how do know that the model predicted mass of
migrants have any real meaning at all? In the next section we answer that question by showing that
it describes the U.S. migration process with reasonably high accuracy. The gross flow of migrants
in the model matches U.S. data pretty well. To account for the discrepancies in the total flow, we
divide the relevant variables on both sides of the regression by the sum of the all values of weights
that is the new l.h.s. variable is y˜k = yk/
∑
k yk and the regressor is x˜k = xk/
∑
k xk. The control
variable remains as is.
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Table 2.4: Regression results for EU - Relative
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept Adjusted R2
2000 0.84328∗∗∗ 0.01700∗∗∗ -0.00046 0.77380
2001 0.83180∗∗∗ 0.01779∗∗∗ -0.00042 0.76270
2002 0.85237∗∗∗ 0.01418∗∗∗ -0.00013 0.77240
2003 0.79403∗∗∗ 0.01494∗∗∗ 0.00063 0.63560
2004 0.77543∗∗∗ 0.01344∗∗ 0.00116 0.58090
2005 0.81675∗∗∗ 0.01351∗∗ 0.00052 0.66860
2006 0.75724∗∗∗ 0.01441∗∗∗ 0.00122 0.68340
2007 0.71356∗∗∗ 0.01980∗∗∗ 0.00104 0.73690
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
The results are presented in Table 2.4. Evidently, the estimated coefficient is now about 0.8
which is much closer to 1. Note that y˜ , x˜ ∈ [0, 1] making them comparable in order. So in relative
sense the theoretical model does quite well in explaining the migration in Europe. However, the it
does not match the total migration; in fact predicts a much higher value.
(a) Relative - normalized values (b) Log relative - log of normalized values
Figure 2.3: Scatter plots showing the normalized actual dyad migration data on TFP simulated
results for the European countries for year 2000.
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In the Fig. 2.3 on the left panel we plot the normalized bilateral migration data on the y-axis
and the predicted values of the same on the x- axis. In the right panel we take the natural log of
both variables to reduce the effects of the outliers. Each point on the scatter plot denotes the real
data and the prediction for a dyad.
2.3.2 The migration network for USA
To check robustness of the mechanism and to test the model on a frictionless benchmark case, we
redo the above exercise on USA. We plug in data of population, per capita GDP, bilateral trade
and TFP distribution for 51 states in the model to generate a migration network. The American
Community Survey (ACS) provides data of interstate migration for 2007. Other years are not
available.
Table 2.5 shows the results of regressing actual data (at level values - nominal and normalized
- relative) on theoretical model results. Even at the nominal level the table shows that TFP changes
can explain most of the migration seen in real data. These regressions are also on dyad observations
and do not consider the direction of flow of migration. The interesting result is that the predicted
total mass of migrants match pretty well with the data. Calibrating the model we see that the total
flow should be around 2%. From previously mentioned ACS data we do get the overall migration
to be around 2%. Thus the orders of the variables are perfectly comparable.
Table 2.5: Regression results for US
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept Adjusted R2
Nominal 0.82695∗∗∗ 0.00006∗∗∗ 0.00000
0.62990
Relative 0.68521∗∗∗ 0.00243∗∗∗ 0.00004
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
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(a) Relative - normalized values (b) Log relative - log of normalized values
Figure 2.4: Scatter plots showing the normalized interstate migration data on the simulation results
for US year 2007, in level and in log.
Fig. 2.4 plots the normalized actual interstate migration on the normalized values of migration
predicted. In the right panel we take natural log - showing a very clear clustering around the fitted
line. Evidently, the bulk of the labor flow is captured by the theoretical model which emphasizes the
productivity-driven migration in line of Klein and Ventura [2009] and Kennan and Walker [2011].
That is, in case of U.S. which was taken as the closest approximation to a frictionless place (in
terms of social and political dimensions), is actually described well by a model emphasizing only
economic incentives behind migration.
2.3.3 Working of the model: multilateral gravity equations
From the tables presented above, the model explains about 63% of the fluctuations in edge weight
of the migration network in case of U.S. (see Table 2.5)) controlling for contiguity. Similarly, in
case of Europe the model explains about 70% on an average (see Table 2.4). In both cases the
coefficient assigned to the TFP-driven migration is sufficiently high (about 0.8 on an average). The
reason the model fits well with the data is that it effectively creates a network that describes a
multilateral gravity equation between all pairs of islands. The basic descriptive equation of gross
flow of labor between any dyad i.e. any pair ({i, j}) of islands is
Fi, j = Ci, j
Li.L jdηi, j
 , (2.45)
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where the Fi, j is the weight of the edge of the network between the i−th and the j−th island (rep-
resenting trade flow or migration) and C is a constant. The equation shows that the labor flow
is proportional to the product of the two islands’ population and inversely proportional to some
power of the distance (dηi, j) between these two islands. Usually, η is found to be very close to 1.
The emergence of such a pattern have been subject to a huge number of empirical studies in the
trade theoretic literature. Chaney [2014]) in particular gives a framework to understand why η is
close to one. In the present context, we do not attempt to embed distance in the model. Therefore,
in all empirical analysis we have controlled for it by using contiguity data. For the same reason, a
reduced form description of our model is
Fi, j = Ci, j(Li.L j). (2.46)
Fig. 2.5 describes the relationship generated by the model, between weights of the dyads in terms
of labor flow and products of populations of the corresponding countries. Evidently it has a good
fit with the idea of multilateral gravity approach except that there is no counterpart of distance in
our model (following Eqn. 2.46).
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Figure 2.5: The model captures the multilateral gravity relation between donor and receiver coun-
tries. We have plotted the weight of dyads (mi j + m ji) as a function of the product of populations
(Li.L j) for all dyads i, j ∈ N
Since in case of European union the distances between the countries do not have particularly
large variations, the weights of the dyads capturing the migration flow depend almost linearly on
the product of population. This is precisely what our model generates in terms of labor flow. Thus
the relationship can be further simplified to
Fi, j = C(Li.L j). (2.47)
Thus the model captures the broad description of the migration network at the macro level as well
as country-pair specific level. An interesting feature of the model is that Ci, j = C as is shown
in Fig. 2.5. This constant parameter C embodies the structure of the economy in the sense that it
captures the structural parameters of the global economy (in our case, the EU or the U.S.) including
the preferences, production technology and the trade patterns. When we make any changes in
such structural parameteres, that will be reflected in the magnitude of that constant and will have
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corresponding effects on the level of migration. We study such cases in Sec. 2.5.
2.4 European immobility puzzle
One of the basic principles behind the formation of the European union was to ensure freedom
of movement of productive inputs. In particular, it was supposed to reduce the barriers in the
labor flow making the market more flexible. Multilateral gravity equation helps us to pin down the
relative strengths of the edges of the migration network. However, as is clear from the above results,
the model shows that under reasonable parameterization the predicted mass of migrants are in the
order of 100 times more than what is seen in Europe for the period we considered (2000-07). This
refers to the puzzle that even after the legal and political barriers have been systematically removed
thus potentially reducing economic frictions on the labor allocation process, people did not respond
immediately to the existing incentives. This problem has attracted attentions both from theoretical
and policy-making point of view. In particular, Belot and Ederveen [2012] ascribes this role to
the negative effects of cultural differences indicating that such distances can induce an extremely
low migratory response if properly addressed. In this chapter, we complement this analysis using
many other types of frictions ranging from social to political along with the obvious factor, lingual
differences. Generally, in this section we look into a list of fine-grained measures of institutional
differences between the 16 European countries and argue that these substitute some of the TFP
driven migration instead of complementing and thus, provide “frictions” opposing the incentives.
2.4.1 Distances in institution and culture
We look at a broad list of variables which could ideally be considered as frictions. We start with
historical links between countries. We used the CEPII data to determine colonial links between
countries or whether the two countries in the dyad were the same country historically.
One of the hypothesis could be that language barrier is one of the reasons which stops people
from migrating easily. To control for this we looked into several language indices. From the CEPII,
bilateral data on whether two countries speak same official language, native language, language
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proximity index and common language index was obtained. In Table 2.6, LangIndex is the common
language index. This index gives an approximate distance between two countries due to language.
If the index is higher that means the two countries have less language barriers. We also looked into
Ethnologue language statistics - country specific data on total number of languages used as first
language, immigrant languages in the country and probability that two people selected at random
will have different mother tongues (Greenberg’s diversity index).
Differences in culture could be another barrier to migration - to control for this we use the
Hofstede’s cultural indices. This is a rich set of index encompassing cultural aspects such as in-
dividualism versus collectivism in the economy, uncertainty avoidance, power distance (strength
of social hierarchy), masculinity-femininity (task orientation versus person-orientation), long-term
orientation and indulgence versus self-restraint. In Table 2.6 ‘Indiv’ refers to Individualism and
‘Pragm’ refers to Pragmatism and they are two of the Hofstede cultural index. These indices are
country specific. For dyad level regression we considered the numerical differences between these
indices for the two countries as a proxy of their ‘distance’ in the corresponding category. So a
higher value in distance for ‘individualism’ between a pair of countries would mean that one coun-
try in the pair believes in individualistic society as a way of life and the other country believes in a
relatively less individualistic society which is another way of saying that the country believes in a
more collective/family-oriented way of life.
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Figure 2.6: Cultural and Institutional Indices for European countries
Next we considered several stability indices broadly related to the polity. All data were col-
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lected from various reports compiled and made publicly available by World Bank. We looked into
government stability, democracy index, ethnic tensions, religious conflicts, military in politics and
external conflicts to understand the political stability in the economy. For each of these risk rating
available on country level we considered the ‘distance’ between the ratings between two countries
for dyad regressions. For socio-economic stability we looked into corruption index, freedom of
press, socio-economic conditions and voice and accountability. Distance between financial sta-
bility indices like financial risk rating, investment profile and existence of shadow economy are
also included as controls. Distance in shadow economy index would mean in the dyad one of the
countries has a huge underground economy and the other one does not.
We also looked into some of the Europe specific dummies - such as using euro or not and entry
into European union. In the next section we look into the regression results on all the mentioned
distance variables.
A general rule we followed is that since many of these frictional variables are extremely corre-
lated especially so when they belong to the same family. We use stepwise regression methodology
to pin down the predictors. Most of the considered ‘friction’ variables under an umbrella term
broadly defining similar characteristics, are correlated. For example, Table 2.8 shows the correla-
tion matrix a number of variables that belong to a broad class of political stability indicators. Given
this level of correlation in the data, we do not consider all variables simultaneously as that will not
increase the predictive power. The point is that many of the frictional variables that turns out to be
important in explaining the puzzle, are not unique. They often have some other measures, almost
similarly defined and hence very correlated, that can be almost equally effective in explaining the
same phenomena.
2.4.2 Explaining the missing flow: effects of institutional factors
For the 16 countries in Europe (same as Sec. 2.3.1) we computed all the institutional distance
measures. As a response variable we consider the ratio of actual bilateral migration data to TFP
driven migration. We regress this on the various institutional measures. The results are tabulated
in Table 2.6. The reason we took the ratio of the data to the model (yk/xk as defined in Eqn. 2.43
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and 2.44 resp.) as the variable to be explained is that this way we get rid of the gravity-effects
which is driven solely by economic causes. Thus the left over variations would be driven by other
non-economic factors. Two methodological points are to be noted. One, some variation in the data
could be due to misreporting which we cannot rectify and two, we are considering the model to
capture the economic incentives completely and in the gravity equation set up, the proportionality
term captures all institutional effects, magnifying or lessening the flow. Consider any pair {i, j}
of dyad k. Given this interpretation, note that yk = Cdatai j .Li.L j/d
η
i j and xk = C
model
i j .Li.L j/d
η
i j and
from Fig. 2.5, we see that Cmodeli, j is roughly a constant, independent of the specific dyad considered
(i.e. Cmodeli, j = C
model). Thus the idea is that a low value of the variable (yk/xk ) indicates that less
migration occurred between a pair of countries consisting the dyad k in reality, than in the model.
Therefore, a negative value of the coefficient of a suitably defined distance metric would indicate
presence of a friction. Alternatively, in presence of similarities in any dimension for example,
lingual, we would expect a higher flow.
Table 2.6 shows the regression results for the European country dyads. For each year, from
2000 to 2007, we regress ratio of actual bilateral migration data to TFP driven migration on Euro
currency dummy and distance between -language index, Hofstede index of individualism (vs. col-
lectivism) and pragmatism, financial risk and shadow economy, controlling for contiguity. The
financial risk index is constructed following a methodology similar to the one used by International
Country Risk Guide [2014] on a set of broadly defined macro indices collected from IMF [2014]
(e.g. exchange rate stability, debt-to-GDP ratio, current account surplus, etc). We also tested for
various political risk factors which did not turn out to be significant.
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Table 2.6: Regression results for EU - frictions
Contiguity LangIndex Indivi Pragm Euro FinRiskInd ShadowEco Intercept AdjR2
2000 0.23∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.05 0.02 -0.01∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.45
2001 0.26∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06 0.02∗ -0.01∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.47
2002 0.21∗∗ 0.39∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.07 0.02 -0.01∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.43
2003 0.22∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06 0.03∗ -0.01 0.61∗∗∗ 0.45
2004 0.18∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.06 0.02∗ -0.01 0.67∗∗∗ 0.43
2005 0.18∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.06 0.02 -0.01∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.41
2006 0.18∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.09 0.01 -0.01∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.33
2007 0.16∗ 0.56∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.02∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.40
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The signs of the coefficients have meaningful interpretation - for example having similar lan-
guage helps in migration (positive signs of the LangIndex) and different cultures act as an im-
pediment to migration (negative signs for distance between cultural index). This exercise shows
that there are factors which encourage or discourage migration, over and above mere economic
incentives.
2.5 Counterfactuals
The model that we have presented above captures the economy in a very short horizon of time.
But it is well known that over a considerable amount of time several economic variables do change
substantially. The empirical observation of structural shift is probably the most prominent example
of it which states that over time the service sector tends to dominate the manufacturing sector
(Acemoglu [2007]). Another interesting observation is that the level of migration itself shows time-
varying properties, for example even in the U.S. there exists a secular decline in the aggregate level
of interstate migration. It has shown about 50% fall over the period of last two decades (Kaplan and
Schulhofer-Wohl [2013]). Similarly in a growing economy, any particular sector taken in isolation,
shows a secular increase in per-capita capital stock. In the context of the present model, we can
use parametric variations to understand the changes in the behavior of economic incentive-driven
migration process in face of these long-run changes in the ‘deep parameters’ of the economy.
The general prediction of the model in all of the following exercises remains valid in the sense
labor flow network essentially captures the multilateral gravity equation type behavior. By making
parametric variations, we can study how total mass of labor migration alters when subjected to
productivity shocks. One can think of such exercises as reflecting changes the coefficient of the
gravity equation (the term multiplying the labor mass, C in Eqn. 2.45)
2.5.1 Structural change
The shift of employment from agriculture to manufacturing and then eventually to service sector
is referred to as structural change (Acemoglu [2007]). Of course, in the modern age agriculture
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has mostly become obsolete in most of the developed countries and the speed at which this change
takes place differ from country to country. However, the gradual shift of employment from manu-
facturing to service are present beneath the facade of growth process of modern economies almost
without any exception. There is a large literature making connections between economic growth
and structural change (see Acemoglu [2007] for a detailed analysis). In the present context, the
effects of structural change on economic growth is not important per se. But since this refers to
an ever-increasing share of service goods in the consumption basket (assuming a demand-driven
structural change), we see an increase in size of the non-tradable sector. This will have important
consequences for labor migration pattern at the aggregate level. Redding et al. [2012] builds a
model of structural change on a framework similar to ours and explains the movement of labor
away from agriculture resulting in urbanization over a century. Instead we take the phenomena
of structural change as given and by parametric variation of preference, we seek to determine the
effects on migratory responses.
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Figure 2.7: Labor employment by sector for 1995 and 2013. This clearlys shows an unidirectional
change in favor of service indicating a structural shift. Due to this movement away from tradables
to non-tradables, it would affect the level of migration.
There are broadly two ways to capture the structural change. One interpretation is that it is
demand-driven that is over time people demand more service goods than manufactured goods (see
for example Echevarria [1997] for a preference-driven mechanism). The simplest way to address
this issue in the current context is to do comparative static between to economies with different
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preference for manufactured goods. For comparison, we assume a symmetric economy consisting
of N = 10 islands where all islands have equal share in initial population (Ln = 1/N∀n) and then
trade matrix is perfectly symmetric in the sense that all elements are 1/N indicating equal weights
attached to all islands by all islands and per-capita GDP is normalized at 1 for every island. With
α = 0.7 and β = 0.3, the total mass of people migrating is about 1.5% whereas if we reduce α
to 0.4, the corresponding value is about 1.6% indicating a marginal increase. The interpretation
is that with higher weight attached to service goods, that sector becomes more important which is
non-tradable. The productivity shocks in the non-tradable sector cannot be mitigated through trade
by definition. Thus it shows a higher level of adjustment in terms of the only movable input, labor.
The elasticity of migration with respect to changes in the preference parameter is seen to be low
reflecting the idea that structural change does not have a pronounced effect on migration.
2.5.2 Increasing asymmetries in the trade network
The trade network (interstate or intra-Europe) is extremely skewed as has been documented in sev-
eral studies. For example Chaney [2014] shows regional asymmetries in trade flow whereas Foer-
ster et al. [2011] and Acemoglu et al. [2012] emphasizes the sectoral aspect of it. Such asymmetries
in trade network also affects the migration process as that network is the medium of transmission
of idiosyncratic sectoral and spatial shocks to other sectors and islands. Thus different degree of
asymmetry in the trade network would imply different levels of spill-over effects of such shocks4
and would eventually result in different levels of migration responses.
In the benchmark case, we assume that share of manufactured goods in the consumption bundle
(α) is 0.4 and the share of capital in the production function (β) is 0.3 and a completely symmetric
trade matrix with all elements 1/N, N being the number of islands. From that we make the trade
matrix completely asymmetric in the sense that it is set to be equal to an identity matrix, effectively
making it manufacturing non-tradable good. The mass of people migrating under this set of pa-
rameter values, is about 1.8% whereas the mass of migrants in the benchmark case is 1.6%. This
4In fact, this is shown very elegantly by Caliendo et al. [2014] although they include an input-output channel as well
which we have ignored for our purpose.
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indicates that again a similar mechanism at work. More emphasis on non-tradables increase the
extent of adjustment process.
2.5.3 Capital deepening
The economic growth process is almost synonymous with accumulation of capital of different
varieties. Thus over time the production process uses more and more capital intensive technology.
In the context of non-balanced economic growth this phenomena has been studied by Acemoglu
and Guierrieri [2008] among others. In the present model, such dependence of capital intensive
technology will evidently affect the migratory responses of workers. The benchmark case is the
same as in the above case (Sec. 2.5.2). By increasing the capital intensity in the production process
(β) to 0.7, we find that the total mass of migrants become almost half of the benchmark scenario.
This is intuitive because the less labor required in the production process, the less would be the
extent of adjustment. However, a potential limitation of this exercise is that in the model capital
is fixed. Thus labor movement becomes much more pronounced as that is the only factor that can
be adjusted which is manifested in the high magnitude of the migration elasticity with respect to
capital intensity.
2.6 Summary and conclusion
We have presented a model of migration based on a richly specified structure originally developed
in the trade theoretic literature following the Eaton-Kortum model (Eaton and Kortum [2002]).
We employ a technique originally developed by Caliendo et al. [2014] to pin down the migratory
responses in a static multi-country, multi-sector economy. Essentially, we treated the model as
representing a general equilibrium set-up. In steady state, the system is subjected to consecutive
shocks under realistic parameterization and from that we generate an directed and weighted net-
work of migration. We calibrate the model to U.S. and a set of European countries (it is the lack
of data on the latter that forced us to focus on a subset rather than the all countries). The model
performs well in explaining the total network of labor flow across U.S. and it matches the gross
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flow of labor with the real data. Interestingly, the model matches the relative flow network for the
European countries pretty well but predicts a much higher value of gross flow of labor than is seen
in the data.
The predictive power of the model lies in the fact that it essentially generates a multilateral
gravity equation in labor flow thus capturing the relative weights pretty well. But the gross flow
depends not only on economic factors but also on an array of institutional factors that comprises
various social, political and lingual dimensions. The good match of the data with the model in case
of U.S. indicates the (institutional) frictionless character of interstate migration. However, when
we study the differences between model and data in case of the European countries, several factors
emerge as dominant frictions reducing migratory responses even in face of economic incentives.
Common language turns out to be an important factor, so are several other social characteristics
(individualism and pragmatism). The presence of informality in the form of shadow economy also
affects the migration decision to a great extent along with financial stability.
A simplifying assumption made throughout the exercise that makes the model tractable, is that
people migrate for economic incentives only. While there are other reasons (for example, family-
related or retirement-related), this is broadly consistent with the data (Kennan and Walker [2011]).
An important issue was raised by Molloy et al. [2011] regarding the effects of the housing sector
on migration. While it is true that there are several instances of sudden increase in country-specific
migration due to housing sector boom, in general that does not play an important role. The present
model could be easily augmented with a housing sector. But Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl [2013]
argues that the housing sector shows much more volatility than the process of migration which is
highly inertial. Molloy et al. [2011] considered this particular channel and showed that there exists
a very weak connections if any, in case of U.S. There are two other simplifications that allows
us to solve the model based on the framework provided by Caliendo et al. [2014]. The first is
regarding the technical issue that labor is the only mobile factor. Secondly, we have assumed that
labor is homogeneous. This assumption implies that labor is perfectly substitutable across countries
(islands) and sectors. Thus we do not have to keep track of different types of labor migrating all
over the world (the set of islands considered). While this assumption restricts us from discussing
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other issues like skill-specific migration, we retain it because of the tractability it provides to the
model.
Given the static nature of the model an important question crops up that can we make long-
run predictions from this model? We have discussed three important scenarios that provides us
corresponding results which are obtained by appropriate changes in the deep parameters describing
the economy. However, since by nature the model is not dynamic, we do not expect it to pick up
the effects of economic fundamentals like a growing capital stock which might aggravate or reduce
the degree of migratory responses generated from the model. But the results would broadly mimic
the present as the current model takes the most basic incentive to migrate into account.
Finally, we can ask a seemingly obvious question : why did we take social distances as a
friction? Would it be possible to imagine a scenario where a higher social distance actually com-
plements migratory responses rather than substituting it. The answer is, it is possible. In south-
to-north migration this may in fact provide an incentive to migrate. For example, people would
migrate from low income countries to comparatively prosperous but only selectively. Along with
economic incentives, migrants also weigh their chances on the socio-political conditions of the
receiving countries. Thus a higher distance between a donor country and a receiver country may
compel individuals to migrate. However, when the countries are more-or-less similar in these re-
spects, this might hinder the labor reallocation process as is found in case of the European countries.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Sources of data
For the European Union we looked into bilateral migration from 2000 to 2007 within Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Germany, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Italy, Hungary, Ireland,
Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, United Kingdom and Norway. Migration is defined as movement
across different countries of residence in one year. More specifically, if a person was in a different
country of residence in the previous year than this year, then we count that person as a migrant.
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Table 2.7: Data Sources
Data Source
Migration - EU Eurostat [2014]
Contiguity - EU CEPII [2014]
Cultural Indices Hofstede et al. [2010]
Economic Indicators World Bank Reports [2011]
Migration - US American Community Survey Data [2007]
Financial Indices IMF [2014]
Table 2.8: Correlation matrix for political stability indices
Voiceacc Polstab Govteffec Reg quality Ruleoflaw Corrupt Transparency
Voiceacc 1.00
Polstab 0.83 1.00
Govteffec 0.83 0.72 1.00
Regulation quality 0.56 0.53 0.72 1.00
Ruleoflaw 0.91 0.84 0.94 0.63 1.00
Corruptcont 0.93 0.84 0.91 0.66 0.96 1.00
TransparencyCPI 0.91 0.76 0.85 0.56 0.91 0.91 1.00
2.7.2 Equilibrium conditions
The basic references for solving this types of models are Caliendo and Parro [2014] and Caliendo
et al. [2014]. Below, we list the equilibrium conditions. We normalize the population so that L = 1
in the following.
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• Labor mobility conditions (N equations):
Lˆn =
( ωˆn
Pˆn
)1/β∑
n Ln(
ωˆn
Pˆn
)1/β
L, (2.48)
where
Pˆn = (PˆMn )
α(PˆSn )
1−α. (2.49)
• Regional market clearing conditions (2N equations):
X j
′
n = α
j(ωˆn(Lˆn)1−βInLn), (2.50)
where the index j refers to sectors M and S .
• Price index (2N equations):
Pˆ jn = (
N∑
i=1
pi
j
ni(xˆ
j
i )
−θ j(Zˆ ji )
θ j)−1/θ
j
, (2.51)
where the index j refers to sectors M and S .
• Trade shares (2N2 equations):
pi
j′
ni = pi
j
ni(
xˆ ji
Pˆ jn
)−θ
j
(Zˆ ji )
θ j , (2.52)
where the index j refers to sectors M and S .
• Labor market clearing (N equations):
ωˆn(Lˆn)(1−β)InLn =
∑
j
∑
i
pi
j′
inX
j′
i , (2.53)
where the index j refers to sectors M and S .
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2.7.3 Solution algorithm
The system can be solved block recursively. We are follow the algorithm presented in Caliendo
et al. [2014] for solving the labor allocation problem resulting from asymmetric productivity shocks
and then ammend it and modify it to suit our purpose. Below we present the steps to be followed
for solving the model. Consider exogenous changes in productivity ZˆMn , Zˆ
S
n for all n. Define an
weight f ∈ (0, 1) to be used to update the guess. In practice, f = 0.99 works well.
• Guess relative change in regional factor prices ωˆ.
• Set xˆ jn = ωˆn and
Pˆ jn = (
N∑
i=1
pi
j
ni(xˆ
j
i )
−θ j(Zˆ ji )
θ j)−1/θ
j
. (2.54)
• Find
pi
j′
ni = pi
j
ni(
xˆ ji
Pˆ jn
κˆ
j
ni)
−θ j(Zˆ ji )
θ j . (2.55)
• Find
Lˆn =
( ωˆn
Pˆn
)1/β∑
n Ln(
ωˆn
Pˆn
)1/β
L, (2.56)
where
Pˆn = (PˆMn )
α(PˆSn )
1−α. (2.57)
• Find
X j
′
n = α
j(ωˆn(Lˆn)1−βInLn). (2.58)
• Find
ωˆnew =
∑
i pi
j′
inX
j′
i
Lˆ(1−β)n (InLn)
(2.59)
• Update the guess by
ωˆ∗ = f .ωˆ + (1 − f ).ωˆnew (2.60)
• Stop if ||ωˆ − ωˆ∗|| ≤ , else go back to the first point above.
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• Find net labor inflow,
Fn = (Lˆn − 1)Ln. (2.61)
• Construct the network of labor flow,
Fi j = −
 (Lˆ j − 1)L j∑
n∈Nout (Lˆn − 1)Ln
 (Lˆi − 1)Li, (2.62)
whereNout is the set of countries from which labor migrates to other countries and j ∈ Nout
. This process generates an directed labor flow network.
• Define a new matrix, F = triu(abs(F + F′)) where the operator triu(.) gives the upper trian-
gular part and abs(.) denotes absolute value of their respective arguments.
Thus one would generate the directed, weighted network between N islands. With repeated
shocks for T periods, one would have T networks each for each period. Summing over them one
can generate the final network. We have averaged the final network thus produced over O(10)
realizations to arrive at a stable network free of fluctuations in the edge weights.
2.7.4 Welfare evaluation
In this section we briefly discuss the welfare effects that result from changes in productivity. As has
been discussed above, the model is solved in terms of ratios of the variables. We apply the same
idea to discuss changes in utility. One aspect of the model is that even though all allocation resulting
from productivity shocks are Pareto optimal. However, in principle as a response to productivity
shocks, the labor might move away so much that total production may go down even though that
would be the optimal (see Caliendo et al. [2014] for more on this feature).
Since at optimal, utility is equalized across all islands we can consider any generic island n
to study the welfare effects. From equations (2.6), (2.17) and (2.18) we can write the change in
welfare as Uˆ = wˆn/Pˆn. Using equation (2.35) and (2.36) with the definition of Pn we can write
ln Uˆ =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
ln Aˆ jn + ln
wˆn
ωˆ
j
n
)
, (2.63)
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where all notations are defined before except A which denotes measured productivity i.e. Aˆ jn =
Zˆ jn/pˆi
j
nn and αM = α, αS = 1 − α. The welfare calculation is easier under a no-trade scenario for
the manufactured goods so that we can disregard the contribution of own share in the production
process pinn. We can expand the second term as
ln
wˆn
ωˆ
j
n
= βln
wˆn
rˆn
= βln
1
Lˆn
. (2.64)
The first equality holds from the definition of the unit cost ω in Eqn. 2.15 and the second follows
from the optimality conditions of the firms (Eqn. 2.17 and 2.18).
Since we see that the actual migration in case of the EU is far less than that of the prediction,
there would be a welfare loss arising out of lower rate of adjustment. To assess the welfare loss, we
need some notations. Assume that the original magnitudes of the shocks and the labor allocation
across islands are {Z} and {L} respectively. The actual shocks that take place is {Z′′}. The corre-
sponding optimal labor allocation should be {L′′}. But we observe a labor allocation {L′}with much
smaller adjustments. Let us denote the shocks required to generate the observed level of migration
by {Z′} (which is much smaller than {Z′′}). Let us denote the optimal response to shocks by a pair
{Z′′, L′′} and the corresponding utility level U |{Z′′},{L′′}. But we do have the actual response {Z′′, L′}
and the corresponding utlity level U |{Z′′},{L′}≤ U |{Z′′},{L′′}.
Now we can write,
U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′′},{L′′} =
U |{Z},{L}
U |{Z′′},{L′′}︸      ︷︷      ︸
term1
U |{Z′},{L′}
U |{Z},{L}︸     ︷︷     ︸
term2
U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′},{L′}︸     ︷︷     ︸
term3
(2.65)
Terms 1 and 2 denote the utility changes due to optimal response to productivity shocks. The
third term has identical labor and capital allocation but different levels of shocks. Note also that if
the manufactured goods are not traded, then the measured productivity is actual productivity and
hence, A = Z. Therefore, we have
ln Uˆ =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
ln Zˆ jn − βlnLˆn
)
, (2.66)
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This in turn implies that for small shocks we can linearize the expression to derive
Uˆ ' 1 +
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
ln Zˆ jn − βlnLˆn
)
. (2.67)
To derive the last equality we have used an approximation that
lim
x→0 e
x ≈ 1 + x. (2.68)
Notice that the difference between term 1 and 2 in Eqn. 2.65 is the degree of productivity shocks.
According to the real data the actual response ({L′} − {L}) is in the order of 1− f = 1/100-th of the
expected migration ({L′′} − {L}) where by f we denote the degree of frictions arising out of socio-
cultural reasons. We can approximate the labor respones to productivity shocks linearly around the
equilibrium. To generate a response of the observed magnitude, we need shocks of similar order
i.e. (1 − f ) fraction of the original. Let us denote the excess gain in utility by ∆,
∆ =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
ln Zˆ jn − βlnLˆn
)
. (2.69)
Remeber that following the convention of the hat notation, we can write the change as
xˆ =
xnew
xold
= 1 + ∆x, (2.70)
where ∆x = xnew − xold. Therefore linearizing Eqn. 2.69 we get
∆ =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
(1 + ∆Z jn) − β(1 + ∆Ln)
)
. (2.71)
Then with the necessary frictions of order f , we have the response to shocks {Z′} as
∆ f =
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j
(
(1 + (1 − f ).∆Z jn) − β(1 + (1 − f ).∆Ln)
)
,
= ∆ − f .
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j(∆Z jn − β∆L jn). (2.72)
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Therefore, we can write the product of the first two terms in Eqn. 2.65 as
U |{Z},{L}
U |{Z′′},{L′′}
U |{Z′},{L′}
U |{Z},{L} = 1 − f .
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j(∆Z jn − β∆Ln). (2.73)
Here again we have used an approximation that
lim
∆→0,x→0
1 + ∆ + x
1 + ∆
≈ 1 + x, (2.74)
Eqn. 2.6 states that the utility level across all islands in equilibrium is given by the real income,
U |{Z},{L} = InPn , (2.75)
where
In = rn
Kn
Ln
+ wn. (2.76)
Therefore, we can write the third term in Eqn. 2.65 as
U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′},{L′} =
In/Pn|{Z′′},{L′}
In/Pn|{Z′},{L′} (2.77)
We rewrite Eqn. 2.77 as
U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′},{L′} =
w′′n L′n+r′′n Kn
P′′n
w′nL′n+r′nKn
P′n
,
=
(
w′′n L′n + r′′n Kn
w′nL′n + r′nKn
) (
P′n
P′′n
)
. (2.78)
Note that the shock process {Z′} is (1 − f ) fraction of {Z′′}. Thus in the numerator and the de-
nominator of the left hand side of Eqn. 2.78, we have idential labor and capital allocation. In the
numerator the factor prices and the final goods prices respond to a bigger productivity shocks {Z′′}
compared to those in the denominator. This shock affects all prices implying that the effect of the
first term is offset by the effect on the second term which moves exactly in the opposite direction.
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The intuition is that if factors do not adjust, then the general effect of i.i.d. productivity shocks
across islands will be approximately zero.
Therefore, the loss of utility due to frictions can be written as
∆U
U
≈ U |{Z′′},{L′}
U |{Z′′},{L′′} − 1,
= − f .
∑
j∈{M,S }
α j(∆Z jn − β∆L jn). (2.79)
To get an estimate of the welfare loss, let us assume that
∆L jn = k.∆Z
j
n, (2.80)
where k is a constant from the model implying that we can rewrite the welfare equation as
∆U/∆Z
U/Z
= − f (1 − kβ), (2.81)
with the steady state value of the shock Z = 1. Assume k = 1 i.e. for TFP shocks in the order of
x%, total mass of migrants would be of the same magnitude. Recalling that β = 0.3, f = 0.99, we
get
∆U/∆Z
U/Z
= −.7. (2.82)
Thus for TFP shocks in the order of 3%, the wellfare loss would be of order 2%.
2.7.5 Regression results with robust errors
In this section, we redo all the regressions with robust standard errors.
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Table 2.9: Regression results with robust errors for EU - Nominal
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept R2
2000 0.05836∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.7808
2001 0.05870∗∗∗ 0.00002∗∗ 0.00000 0.7700
2002 0.06118∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.7794
2003 0.05456∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.6468
2004 0.05709∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.5938
2005 0.06132∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.6788
2006 0.06376∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.6927
2007 0.06030∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00000 0.7450
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
Table 2.10: Regression results with robust errors for EU - Relative
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept R2
2000 0.84328∗∗∗ 0.01700∗∗∗ -0.00046 0.7808
2001 0.83180∗∗∗ 0.01779∗∗ -0.00042 0.7700
2002 0.85237∗∗∗ 0.01418∗∗∗ -0.00013 0.7794
2003 0.79403∗∗∗ 0.01494∗∗ 0.00063 0.6468
2004 0.77543∗∗∗ 0.01344∗∗ 0.00116 0.5938
2005 0.81675∗∗∗ 0.01351∗∗ 0.00052 0.6788
2006 0.75724∗∗∗ 0.01441∗∗ 0.00122 0.6927
2007 0.71356∗∗∗ 0.01980∗∗ 0.00104 0.7450
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 2.11: Regression results with robust errors for US
TFP driven migration Contiguity Intercept R2
Nominal 0.82695∗∗∗ 0.00006∗∗∗ 0.00000
0.6305
Relative 0.68521∗∗∗ 0.00243∗∗∗ 0.00004
Note: *p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 2.12: Regression results with robust errors for EU - frictions
Contiguity LangIndex Indivi Pragm Euro FinRiskInd ShadowEco Intercept R2
2000 0.23∗ 0.38∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.05 0.02 -0.01∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.5115
2001 0.26∗∗ 0.36∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗ -0.06 0.02∗ -0.01∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.5245
2002 0.21∗ 0.39∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.12∗ -0.07 0.02 -0.01∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.4955
2003 0.22∗ 0.48∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.06 0.03∗ -0.01∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.5075
2004 0.18 0.52∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.13∗∗ -0.06 0.02∗∗ -0.01 0.67∗∗ 0.4870
2005 0.18 0.45∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.06 0.02∗ -0.01∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.4726
2006 0.18 0.54∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.08∗ -0.09 0.01 -0.01∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.4017
2007 0.16 0.56∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.10∗ -0.19∗∗ 0.02 -0.02∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.4580
74
2.7.6 Panel Regression results
Table 2.13: Panel regression result for EU - Nominal
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
TFP driven migration 0.061∗∗
(0.004)
Contiguity 0.000∗∗
(0.000)
Intercept 0.000
(0.000)
N 528
χ2(2) 258.821
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Table 2.14: Panel regression result for EU - Relative
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
TFP driven migration 0.664∗∗
(0.040)
Contiguity 0.015∗∗
(0.004)
Intercept 0.003
(0.002)
N 528
χ2(2) 276.957
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Table 2.15: Panel regression result for EU - frictions
Variable Coefficient
(Std. Err.)
Contiguity 0.210∗∗
(0.077)
LangIndex 0.476∗∗
(0.146)
Individualism -0.099∗∗
(0.035)
Pragmatism -0.083∗
(0.033)
Euro -0.002
(0.016)
Financial risk 0.000
(0.002)
Shadow Econ -0.003
(0.005)
Intercept 0.494∗∗
(0.157)
N 528
χ2(7) 43.308
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2.7.7 Additional Plots
We would like to understand the influence of each variable which is used as friction. We use the
post-estimation tool partial regression plot for this. In the dyad regression the dependent variable is
the ratio of bilateral migration as seen in data to bilateral migration which is TFP driven (simulated).
We try to understand the importance of each variable, for example language index - for this we first
regress the dependent variable on the remaining regressors (not including language index) and plot
the residuals on the Y-axis. Next we regress language index on the remaining regressors and plot
the residuals on the X-axis. These plots show relation between the dependent variable and each
friction variable.
We use the component plus residual plot (partial residual plot) to get more clarity on the func-
tional form of the relation between the dependent variable and friction variables 1-by-1. For exam-
ple to understand the relation between the ratio of bilateral migration in data to TFP driven bilateral
migration (y-variable) to language index we first regress y on all the x variables. Then we subtract
the effect of all the other regressors (not language index) from the y-variable and plot that on the Y-
axis.We call this component plus residual. We compare it with the language index which is plotted
on theX-axis.
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Figure 2.8: The partial regression plot for all the variables in 2000
Figure 2.9: The partial regression plot for all the variables in 2007
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Figure 2.10: The partial residual plot for language index in 2007
2.7.8 Explanation of Individualism and Pragmatism
We use the Hofstede index to measure cultural differences in the European countries. We consider
the following indices -
• Indulgence
• Pragmatism
• Uncertainty Avoidance
• Masculinity
• Individualism
• Power distance
Out of these ‘Pragmatism’ and ‘Individualism’ most meaningfully explained the frictions.
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Hofstede [2015] define ‘Individualism’ as “The fundamental issue addressed by this dimension
is the degree of interdependence a society maintains among its members. It has to do with whether
people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “We”. In Individualist societies people are sup-
posed to look after themselves and their direct family only. In Collectivist societies people belong
to in groups that take care of them in exchange for loyalty.”
‘Pragmatism’ as “This dimension describes how every society has to maintain some links with
its own past while dealing with the challenges of the present and future, and societies prioritise
these two existential goals differently. Normative societies who score low on this dimension, for
example, prefer to maintain time-honoured traditions and norms while viewing societal change
with suspicion. Those with a culture which scores high, on the other hand, take a more pragmatic
approach: they encourage thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future.”
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Table 2.16: Cultural index data
Country Individualism Pragmatism
Austria 55 60
Belgium 75 82
Denmark 74 35
Spain 51 48
Germany 67 83
Czech Republic 58 70
Finland 63 38
France 71 63
Italy 76 61
Hungary 80 58
Ireland 70 24
Netherlands 80 67
Sweden 71 53
Slovenia 27 49
United Kingdom 89 51
Norway 69 35
.
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Chapter 3
Falling Behind or Catching up - Structural Break Story of Africa’s Convergence
(with Fan Zhuo)
In this empirical chapter we show that the “iron-law” of convergence (2%) stills holds for the world.
We detect a break in Africa’s convergence rate and argue that Africa was not really converging
before 2000. The world convergence rate before 2000 was mostly driven by Asian and Latin
American countries. We show that the recent institutional and infrastructural development has led
the African countries on the path of “catching up”. We use LASSO to select the variables and use
the double selection method to estimate the treatment effect in the partially linear model. We also
compare LASSO variable selections with GBM and Random Forest variable selections.
3.1 Introduction
There has been a surge of empirical literature on the topic of growth and specifically convergence in
the past two decades. With data, these papers like to test whether real per capita income differences
between rich and poor countries reduce in the long run. According to the neoclassical theory,
as developed by Solow [1956], the poorer countries have capital-labor ratio much lower than the
optimum, making their rate of return higher on fixed investment, which leads to a faster growth rate
compared to rich countries - essentially the convergence hypothesis says that poor countries “catch
up” with the per capita income levels of the rich countries.
In the seminal contribution, Baumol [1986] uses Maddison’s data to empirically calculate the
convergence rate. Later Barro [1991], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1991, 1992] find roughly 2% con-
vergence rate and recently Barro [2012] estimates the convergence rate conditioned on a set of
variables. Barro [2012] tries to test the iron-law of convergence (2%) rate for a panel of countries
for five year intervals ending 2009. He particularly looks at cases when to include country fixed
effects and suggests that unless the data spans for a century, panel models predicting convergence
rate should not include fixed effects.
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The available empirical evidence does not support the universal convergence hypothesis unidi-
rectionally. There is a lot of evidence suggesting diverging productivity levels and real per capita
incomes between the group of advanced industrialized economies on the one hand and the de-
veloping countries on the other. Pritchett [1997] and Jones [1997] show the diverging absolute
convergence. Collier [2007] in his book raises the question of how the countries are actually di-
verging in growth rates since end of 1980’s. This book is one of the most important motivations
for this chapter. We empirically justify Collier’s point. Khan [2011] excludes the Sub-Saharan
African countries and shows beta-convergence. In this chapter we analyze five group of countries -
(1) World (all the countries taken together) (2) Africa (countries in the African continent) (3) Asia
and other rich developed countries (countries in the Asian continent, and US, Canada, Europe,
Australia and New Zealand) (4) Africa and other rich developed rich countries (countries in the
African continent, and US, Canada, Europe, Australia and New Zealand) (5) World without Africa
(all the countries except the countries in the African continent). We calculate the convergence rate
in each case.
There are numerous papers that look into structural break in the macroeconomic variables and
few specially in convergence rate. Attfield [2003] looks into structural break in output growth for
EU. He found shift in the mean in 1993Q3. We use the Bai and Perron [1998, 2003] methodology to
test for structural break in Africa’s growth, per capita income and convergence gap. We divide the
total time period based on the results from structural break and estimate convergence rate separately
for each sub-period. Arbache and Page [2010] try to argue that post 1995 Africa has seen growth
but this is a ”fragile growth”. We show that both the resourceful and non-resourceful countries in
Africa converge post 1995.
We calculate the convergence rate for each subperiod using double selection methodlogy for
estimation of treatment effect in a partially linear model. We start from a big list of probable covari-
ates and use Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) to select these variables.
Tibshirani [1996] proposed methodolgies of shrinkages in dimensions through LASSO. Belloni
et al. [2011, 2012, 2014] have developed various techniques for high dimensional sparse models.
Using the Barro-Lee data they apply LASSO and post-LASSO techniques to estimate the conver-
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gence rate at 3%. Barro and other authors mostly use economic reasoning to choose the instruments
and variables to condition-on. We use Belloni et al.’s methodology in this chapter. We also compare
our results with GBM and Random Forest variable selection results.
Section 3.2 discusses the theory behind the convergence rate which we estimate in this chapter.
In section 3.3 we discuss the main empirical results of the chapter. In the final section of this
chapter we discuss the reasons on why African countries are converging post 1995. The focus is
on institutional and infrastructural variables; a within growth policy in the countries.
3.2 Conditional Convergence
In this section we briefly describe the theoretical neoclassical growth model. The production func-
tion is given as:
Y = A · F(K, L), (3.1)
where F(·) satisfies the constatnt returns to scale in capital, K and labor, L assumption. Let y := Y
L
be the output per worker and k :=
K
L
be the capital per worker. The relationship is then given by:
y = f (k) (3.2)
Let us assume that f (k) satisfies the usual neoclassical properties. Assuming the economy to be
closed, savings equals investments. Initially we assume no government sector as well, however as
an extension government purchases and taxes are allowed. The labor force is assumed to be fully
employed and corresponds to L in equation 3.1. Given all assumtions, y and k can be interpreted as
per capita quantities.
The labor force is related to the population in a fixed way. The population is assumed to grow
at a rate n. in the baseline model n is constant over time within an economy but can differ across
economies. Using the Malthusian framework, population growth rate can be endogenized. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin [2003] allow for choices of fertility rate for a given mortality rate. An economy
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with lower n at a given y tends to grow faster. Child rearing costs and preferences can shift the path
of n when considered in relation to y.
The gross savings rate (which inturn equals to the ratio of gross investment to GDP) is rep-
resented by s. Extending the baseline model where s is constant (Solow-Swan framework) to
endogenized savings rate (Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans framework) - the representative household de-
termines the optimal savings rate at each point in time based on an iso-elastic, time-additive utility
function. s then varies over time within economies along the transition path to steady state. De-
pending on the preferences and other parameters, across economies, the path of s can shift when
considered in relation to y. An economy with higher s at a given y tends to grow faster.
In the baseline model, the productivity factor A is assumed to rise over time due to exoge-
nous technical progress. The usual way to represent the technical progress is to introduce labor-
augmenting technology such that effective labor Lˆ := Lext and effective output and capital per
capita is given by yˆ :=
Y
Lˆ
and kˆ :=
K
Lˆ
. x is the rate of technological progress.
In extensions, differences in A (within or across economies) can be endogenized by quality of
institutions, efficiency of tax system, clear definitions of property rights and successful R& D activ-
ities. Thus endogenous technical change leads to endogenizing of the productivity factor. Further it
can be argued that countries with higher levels of school attainment and better institutional quality
will have higher technological diffusion.
Borrowing from Barro [2012], we can summarize the above discussion in the equation below:
Dyit = Φ(yit
(−)
, sit
(+)
, nit
(−)
, Ait
(+)
, ...) (3.3)
where Dyit is the growth rate of real per capita GDP for country i at time t. The negative sign under
yit reflects convergence, conditional on the other variables. This is the framework for conditional
beta-convergence.
There are basically two assumptions we can consider before taking a closer look at the beta-
convergence for the world. The first assumption is that the steady state is the same for all the
countries and they converge to this steady state at different paces, which are lower for rich countries
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and higher for poor ones. This is called absolute beta-convergence. In conditional beta-convergence
countries will still converge, however the long-run steady states vary across countries and depend
on a series of factors, such as a country’s instituions and education level.
The model we used to measure the conditional beta-convergence has the form:
ln(
yi,t
yi,t−1
) = α + β ln(yi,t−1) + γ′zi,t−1 + εi,t, (3.4)
where yi,t is the GDP per capital in country i at time t, zi,t are the other factors that influence the GDP
growth rate (as described by equation 3) and εi,t is an error term. The test of the beta-convergence
hypothesis is equivalent to show that β is negative and significant, conditional on different factors
included in zi,t.
3.3 Empirical Results
In this section we present the empirical results. Our first aim was to check if the 2% “iron-law”
of convergence still holds for the world, when recent data is used. Next we wanted to study the
African countries and understand whether they are “catching-up”. The first subsection discusses
the data and gives some descriptive graphs. The next subsection talks about structural change in
Africa’s real per capita GDP. We use LASSO to select the variables and compare this selection with
other data mining techniques - the subsection on methodology discusses each of them. And finally
the key results are presented in the last subsection.
3.3.1 Data
Using Penn World Tables, we looked into the real per capita GDP (chained PPPs in mil 2005 US
dollars) for all the countries in the world from 1960 - 2010. For Africa, we had real per capita
income data for 41 countries in 1960 - 1970 and 48 countries in 1970 - 2010. Figure 3.1 gives the
average real per capita income of the African continent. The mean is simple average and is not
weighted by population.
Looking at figure 3.1, we can say that post 1992 - 1993 there has been an upward trend in the
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Figure 3.1: Real Per Capita GDP over the years
real per capita GDP for Africa. In the period 1975 - 1992 the real per capita GDP actually went
down.
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Figure 3.2: Growth in Real Per Capita GDP over the years
In figure 3.2 we look at the yearly growth rate of real per capita GDP for the African continent.
We also fit a polynomial to estimate the growth trend. We can draw a similar conclusion that post
1993 Africa’s real per capita growth has been positive and the trend can be clearly distinguished
from previous years 1978 - 1992.
The basic convergence potential of countries is measured by the income gap that separates them
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from rich countries. Indexing US as the rich country, figure 3.3 gives the convergence gap of Asia
and Africa with respect to US. The figure gives the regions real per capita GDP as percentage of
US’s real per capita GDP (essentially if we had to plot US’s real per capita income it would be
100).
Growth rate - Africa 
50
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Asia Africa
Figure 3.3: Convergence gaps for Asia and Africa in 1960-2010
Clearly, Asia has been steadily closing the gap since the late 70’s. Africa has only recently
experienced a small closing in the difference of incomes. In the period post 2000, Africa looks like
having a turn towards “catching-up”.
There has been argument (Arbache and Page [2010]) that only the “resourceful” African coun-
tries have seen the recent trend towards higher real per capita GDP. We look into the “non-resourceful”
(as classified by the World Bank) African countries. Figure 3.4 plots the average real per capita
GDP of these countries. Very similar to figure 3.1, this graph also shows a rising trend in the real
per capita post early 90’s and definitely in the recent years.
3.3.2 Structural Change
We apply the methods of Bai and Perron [1998, 2003] to estimate multiple break dates for Africa’s
income, growth and convergence gap over 1960-2011 without prior knowledge of when those
breaks occur. When we look into figures 3.1-3.4 we can say that there has been a change in mean
over time and we want to test this hypothesis using structural break tests. Bai and Perron [1998,
89
Africa's GDP relative to USA
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Lo
g 
P
e
r 
C
ap
it
a 
R
e
al
 G
D
P
 
Non-resourceful African Countries 
Figure 3.4: Real Per Capita GDP in 1960-2010
2003] provide a least-squares based algorithm for estimating the break dates, significance tests and
suggestions for how to interpret the various tests. We used the BIC to estimate the break dates. We
refer the reader to Bai and Perron [1998, 2003] for further details. The column groupings in Table
-3.1 (e.g . Pre-75, 75 to 2000, etc.) are based on the results (where the clustering seemed to occur)
and are meant simply for ease of reading the table.
If we look at the break date estimates and compare it with the graphs in the previous section,
we can say that the post 2003, there has been a clear growth in real per capita income; post 2003
the convergence gap (with US) seems to be decreasing, even though slightly. We look into a formal
model to measure conditional convergence in the next two subsections - but based on the break
date estimates we can conjecture that the convergence coefficient will be significant post 2003.
We also look into the real per capita GDP for the countries in Africa which are considered
non-resourceful and found structural break in 2003 (among recent years). This evidence suggests
that even the countires in Africa which are not necessarily resource abundant have seen a change in
the real per capita GDP in the recent years. It is argued that Africa’s growth is led by resourceful-
countries which see high exports rather than a self-contained growth within Africa. In this chapter
we have tried to argue that the recent growth (diminishing convergence gap) is due to institutional
and infrastructural dvelopment within the countries. We discuss this in section 3.4.
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Table 3.1: Break date estimates
Pre 1975 1975-2000 2001-2010
Real Per Capita GDP 1969 1986 2003
Growth of Real Per Capita GDP 1974 2003
Convergence Gap 1985 1993 2003
Non-Resourceful Africa GDP 1969 2003
Note: Break dates are estimted using the Bai and Perron [1998, 2003]
methodology. Gauss code is made available by Bai and Perron. We
report the break dates as chosen by the BIC criterion as explained in
Bai and Perron [2003]. We imposed a maximum number of 3 breaks;
the sample runs from 1961 through 2010.
3.3.3 Results - absolute convergence, sigma-convergence and panel methods
Two countries exhibit convergence if the poorer country with lower initial income grows faster
than the other (beta-convergence). Absolute convergence happens if countries’ per capita income
converges to a steady state value. The absolute beta-convergence is estimated by cross-country
regression of per capita income growth on initial per capita income. The “iron-law” of convergence
is 2% implying countries eliminate gaps in initial real per capita income at a rate of 2% per year.
We have real income data for 142 countries in 1970, with years that increases to 165 countries
in 2010. The dependent variable in the absolute convergence regression is each country’s growth
rate of real per capita GDP over eight 5-year intervals from 1970-1975 to 2005-2010. The only
independent variable is initial real per capita GDP. We present the absolute convergence results in
table 3.2. Based on the structural change results we grouped 1970-1995 and 1995-2010 and also
estimated the absolute beta-convergence.
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Table 3.2: Absolute beta-convergence
Absolute Convergence p-value
1970-1975 0.004 0.19
1975-1980 0.006 0.07
1980-1985 -0.01 0
1985-1990 0.011 0
1990-1995 0.002 0.6
1995-2000 0.001 0.73
2000-2005 -0.003 0.36
2005-2010 -0.006 0
1970-1995 0.002 0.42
1995-2010 -0.003 0.07
Absolute convergence implies a tendency towards the equalization of per capita incomes, i.e.
“catch up” growth. For the period 1995 - 2010, the coefficient has the right sign (negative) and is
significant at 10%. However the coefficient is very small and not as high as 2%. So the analysis
does give us some evidence of economies converging over 1995 - 2010, but the rate is very small.
When the dispersion of real per capita GDP across a group of economies falls over time, there is
said to be sigma-convergence. The progress in sigma-convergence is dependent on both differential
rates of growth between poorer and richer countries, and also the size of the initial income gap. We
measure the standard deviation of the countries’ (all countries for which data is available) real per
capita GDP over 5 year intervals and report the results in table 3.3.
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Table 3.3: Sigma-convergence
Standard deviation
1970 1.1
1975 1.15
1980 1.2
1985 1.16
1990 1.22
1995 1.28
2000 1.31
2005 1.32
2010 1.29
Beta-convergence is said to be necessary but not a sufficient condition for sigma-convergence.
Beta-convergence implies the existence of a longer-term catch-up mechanism, i.e. forces which
work towards the narrowing of income differences across countries. However there can be tempo-
rary shocks which might affect the short-run growth. Thus having beta-convergence might not be
reflected in changes of dispersion of income levels. In our analysis we find the dispersion in 2000
is higher compared to 2010. So by just comparing year 2000 and year 2010 we might conclude
that there is sigma-convergence in the world, however this might be too myopic conclusion.
Barro [2012] discusses panel data methodologies to estimate conditional beta-convergence. He
concludes by saying that inclusion of country fixed effects produces much higher convergence rates
and eliminates statistically significant effects of the institutional measures on economic growth. He
further states that there are econometric issues associated with inclusion of country fixed effects
in short panels. We start with a balanced panel of 66 countries and eight 5-year intervals (1970-
75, 75-80..2005-2010) and estimate the conditional beta-convergence coefficient. We use similar
covariates as used by Barro [2012]. The data sources are discussed in the appendix.
In table 3.4 we find similar results as Barro [2012]. The conditional beta-convergence coeffi-
cient without any country fixed effects is -0.017 implying convergence rate of 1.7%. With fixed
effects the convergence rate is 6% which clearly is too high and as Barro suggests, it is overesti-
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mated. Variables like fertility rate, terms of trade, life expectancy at birth lose significance when
fixed effects are considered.
Table 3.4: Growth-Rate Regressions for Cross-Country Panel
No Fixed Effects With Fixed Effects
Log Per Capita GDP −0.0171
(0.0033)
∗∗ −0.0588
(0.0064)
∗∗
Female School Years 0.0001
(0.0012)
0.0039
(0.0037)
Fertility rate −0.0088
(0.002)
∗∗ 0.0014
(0.0035)
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.0011
(0.0004)
∗∗ 0.0013
(0.0007)
Inflation rate 0.0000
(0)
0.0000
(0)
Political Status −0.0233
(0.0122)
−0.0202
(0.0132)
Exchange Rate 0.0000
(0)
0.0000
(0)
Investment share −0.0161
(0.0211)
0.0281
(0.0311)
Government expenditure share −0.0233
(0.0221)
−0.019
(0.0316)
Openness ratio 0.0112
(0.0052)
∗ 0.0066
(0.0104)
Terms of trade −0.0188
(0.0048)
∗∗ −0.0151
(0.0052)
Political rights 0.0275
(0.0133)
∗ 0.0206
(0.0144)
∗∗
Civil Liberty 0.0009
(0.0143)
−0.0039
(0.0173)
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01. Time effects are included in the regressions
Next we run cross-country regression for the African continent. Based on the structural test
results we divide the period into five and three 5-year intervals, so 1970-75, 75-80,.., 90-95 as
one set (henceforth referred as Pre-2000) and 1995-2000, 2000-2005 and 2005-2010 as another
set (henceforth referred as Post-2000). For pre-2000 regression there were only 15 countries for
whom balanced panel was available. Most of these countries were resourceful countries. In table
3.5, the 4% convergence rate pre-2000 is biased for the countries in the sample. However in post-
2000 regression we are looking at 35 countries with balanced panel. An important feature about
post-2000 regression result is also the significance of “average years of schooling” variable. In the
next few sections we argue that the recent growth in Africa can be attributed to institutional and
infrastructural development and this gives some evidence towards it.
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We conclude this section by emphasizing on the results - firstly we find that the conditional
convergence rate is around 2% for the world. Secondly, looking at absolute convergence and sigma-
convergence we might say that only in recent years are the countries moving to the one steady state
path. Thirdly, even though the world is converging at 2%, we need to analyze Africa’s case a little
more.
Table 3.5: Growth-Rate Regressions for Cross-Country Panel - Africa
Pre-2000 Post-2000
Log Per Capita GDP −0.0429
(0.0171)
∗ −0.0459
(0.0094)
∗∗
Female School Years −0.0021
(0.0056)
0.0095
(0.0032)
∗∗
Fertility rate −0.0136
(0.007)
−0.0035
(0.0064)
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.005
(0.0018)
∗∗ 0.0018
(0.0007)
∗
Inflation rate −0.0006
(0.0002)
∗ −0.0001
(0.0001)
Political Status 0.0264
(0.0344)
−0.0214
(0.0287)
Exchange Rate 0.0001
(0)
0
(0)
Investment share −0.0776
(0.0487)
0.0622
(0.0563)
Government expenditure share 0.0153
(0.0486)
0.0841
(0.0669)
Openness ratio −0.029
(0.0293)
0.0066
(0.0178)
Terms of trade 0.0006
(0.0185)
−0.1077
(0.0496)
∗
Political rights 0.0077
(0.0398)
0.0473
(0.035)
Civil Liberty −0.0124
(0.0502)
−0.0363
(0.0446)
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01. Time effects are included in the regressions
3.3.4 Variable Selection Methodology
Our aim is to analyze Africa’s conditional convergence rate pre-2000 and post-2000. Traditional
panel methodologies do not give the option to select from a wide range of variables, in the last
section we used only those as used by Barro [2012]. Also with only 15 countries having a balanced
panel - pre-2000 we might be analyzing a self-selected sample. In this section, we apply double
selection approach as in Belloni et al. [2011]. In this method we follow 3 steps (please refer to
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equation 3.4 for notations):
1. Selecting controls zi,t−1’s that predict yi,t−1.
2. Selecting controls zi,t−1’s that predict (
yi,t
yi,t−1 ).
3. Run Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): ( yi,tyi,t−1 ) on yi,t−1 and the union of controls selected in the
two previous steps.
This method was suggested in Leeb and Potscher [2008] to control the omitted variable bias.
In our model, this double selection approach is necessary as there are covariates in Zi,t−1 that are
correlated with yi,t−1 and do not get selected in step 2. For selecting variables we apply LASSO
methodology. In a selection and estimation problem like ours OLS is usually criticized on three
grounds. Firstly, almost sparsity - in a situation when p >> n there clearly is curse of dimension-
ality and the degrees of freedom is insufficient but also in the case where p is same as n we need a
methodology which can zero out the effects of some of the variables at front. Secondly, interpre-
tation - with a large number of availabe predictors, we would like determine a smaller subset but
with strongest effects. Thirdly, the prediction accuracy - OLS estimator is best linear unbiased but
when there are many correlated variables it has low bias and large variance. Prediction accuracy
can be sometimes improved by shrinking or setting some of the coefficients to 0. By doing so the
bias is slightly sacrificed for a much lower variance which overall improves the variance accuracy.
In a usual regression setting, suppose we have data (xi, yi), i = 1, 2, ...,N,where xi = (xi1, ..., xip)T
and yi are the regressors and response for the ith observation. OLS estimates are obtained by min-
imizing the residual squared error. LASSO shrinks the coefficients of some of the covariates to 0.
Formally, letting βˆ = (βˆ1, ..., βˆp)T , the lasso estimate (αˆ, βˆ) is defined as:
(αˆ, βˆ) = argmin
 N∑
i=1
yi − α −∑
j
β jxi j

2 subject to ∑
j
|β j| ≤ t (3.5)
Here t ≥ 0 is the tuning parameter.
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We use LASSO to select the variables in steps 1 and 2 and then run OLS in step 3. To make a
comparison in terms of selection methodlogy - we also use Random Forest and Gradient Boosting
Methodlogy to select the variables in steps 1 and 2.
Random Forest (RF) is an unsupervised learning mechanism. It is based on building a large
collecion of decorrelated trees and then averaging them. Regression trees sub-divide or partition
the data space (usually training-data) into smaller regions. They again partition the sub-divisons
to get simple regions, in these final regions (terminal nodes or leaves) simple model is fit. The
regression model predicts Y based on an average from all the final regions. The partitions are
done using greedy algorithm (locally optimal strategy at each step with the hope of finding global
optimum). In Random Forest before each split, m ≤ p of the input variables at random are selected
as candidates for splitting. At each split in each tree, the improvement in the split-criterion is the
importance measure attributed to the splitting variable, and is accumulated over all the trees in the
forest separately for each variable. This is how variable importance is measured.
Gradient Boostng is a machine learning technique to solve regression problems. GBM builds
the model stagewise and it generalizes them by allowing optimization of an arbitrary differentiable
loss function. The goal is to find an approximation to Fˆ(x) to a function F∗(x) that minimizes the
expected value of a specified loss function. It starts by considering a constant function F0(x) and
then expanding in a greedy way. It applies the steepest descent step to the minimization problem
in order to choose the best f . It is an ensemble of weak prediction model, usually decision trees.
As in Random Forest, the squared relative importance of variable xl is the sum of such squared
improvements over all internal nodes for which it was chosen as the splitting variable.
We use LASSO, RF and GBM to select the variables in step 1 and 2 and then use OLS to get
the treatment and marginal effects.
3.3.5 Results - conditional convergence
Conditional convergence, allows each country to have a different level of per capita income towards
which it is converging. This implies that each country is converging to its own steady state and that
in the long run all the countries will have the same growth rates. We use the three steps as listed in
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the previous section to estimate the conditional convergence coefficient for the different groups of
countries.
In the appendix (table 3.9) we provide the correlation matrix for a subset of variables (the
data is for the world in year 2000). The correlation among the variables is stronger for African
countries. This provides evidence in why OLS without model selection might give a large variance
(many correlated variables).
We next present the conditional convergence coefficients for each selection criterion we used.
Table 3.6: Conditional beta-convergence coefficient, Pre-2000
LASSO GBM RF
World −0.016
(0.006)
∗ −0.02
(0.0057)
∗ −0.017
(0.0064)
∗
Africa −0.004
(0.0161)
−0.016
(0.0131)
−0.016
(0.0121)
Africa and Non-African Rich Countries −0.004
(0.0075)
−0.013
(0.0073)
−0.006
(0.008)
World without Africa −0.026
(0.0064)
∗ −0.027
(0.0058)
∗ −0.023
(0.0063)
∗
Asia and Non-African Rich Countries −0.025
(0.0082)
∗ −0.028
(0.0079)
∗ −0.026
(0.0082)
∗
Note: *p<.05
In the table non-African rich countries mean Europe, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand.
From table 3.6 we can point a few things - firstly GBM gives the least variance for the beta-
coefficient. Secondly, as already said in previous sections that the world is converging at a rate of
around 2%. But different regions are converging at different rates. Specifically it looks like Africa
was not converging before 2000. When we looked into the graphs of convergence gap between US -
Asia and US - Africa we had concluded saying that the Asian countries have achieved to reduce the
gap before 2000. The results in table 3.6 reconfirm this. Thirdly, re-emphasizing African countries
do not look like converging before 2000. This is in line with the Bottom Billion book’s argument
saying that some countries were “trapped” in the late 80’s period.
Next, we look into the post 2000 period and present the results in table 3.7.
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Table 3.7: Conditional beta-convergence coefficient, Post-2000
LASSO GBM RF
World −0.014
(0.0049)
∗ −0.019
(0.0051)
∗ −0.018
(0.0052)
∗
Africa −0.044
(0.0161)
∗ −0.058
(0.0165)
∗ −0.051
(0.0205)
∗
Africa and Non-African Rich Countries −0.032
(0.0088)
∗ −0.031
(0.0095)
∗ −0.031
(0.0105)
∗
World without Africa −0.009
(0.0046)
∗ −0.011
(0.0063)
∗ −0.014
(0.0072)
∗
Asia and Non-African Rich Countries −0.013
(0.006)
∗ −0.015
(0.0078)
∗ −0.012
(0.0075)
∗
Note: *p<.05
Looking at table 3.7 we can say that the world still converges at a rate around 2%. But now the
regional convergence story is quite different. Especially if we look into “World without Africa” -
the convergence rate is even less than 1%. The convergence in the world in this period is driven by
African countries.
3.4 Institutional and Infrastructural Change
We argue that the recent trend of convergence and growth in the African countries is due to core
institutional and infrastructural development. We first look into the variables that were significant in
the post-2000 estimation of convergence rate for Africa. We note here that the pre-2000 estimation
only had the intercept and average growth of neighboring countries as significant.
From table 3.8 we can say that variabels like “female school years”, “mortality rate” and “gov-
ernment expenditure share” provide some evidence towards the importance of “from-within” de-
velopment.
(Next we provide some more analysis to show instittional and infrastructural development.)
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Table 3.8: Double Selection Significant Estimates, Africa - Post-2000
Variable Lower CI Upper CI
Intercept 0.135132 0.361932
Log Per Capita GDP -0.060947 -0.027612
Female Secondary School Years 0.021367 0.065483
Mortality Rate -0.001141 -0.000187
French Language Speaking -0.057556 -0.011187
British Colony -0.057361 -0.005741
Exchange Rate 0.000004 0.000027
Government Expenditure Share 0.017651 0.298206
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter LASSO selection and double selection estimation methodologies are used to in-
vestigate the convergence properties of African counrties. We start with structural break tests on
the growth and convergence rate, and find that there is a structural break in African growth and
convergence rate. We divide the regimes as pre-2000 and post-2000 and estimate the conditional
convergence rate. We find that Africa (even as a ‘club’ by itself) was not converging pre-2000
whereas post-2000 it is converging and the rate is 4%. We used LASSO to select from numerous
variables. We also used GBM and Random Forest to compare the selections.
We attribute the post-2000 convergence to more institutional and infrastructural development
within Africa. Before the late 1990’s it was mainly foreign aid which was leading to some growth
in the ‘non-resourceful’ African countries, but in recent years there has been development ‘from-
within’ the countries.
As next steps it would be perhaps meaningful to disaggregate the African ‘convergence-club’
to smaller meaningful groups and see if the story still holds for each of these groups.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Correlation among variables
Table 3.9: Glimpse of correlation structure in the data
luF lpF lsF yrschF yrschpriF yrschsecF luM lpM lsM yrschM yrschpriM yrschsecM
luF - -0.48 -0.77 -0.91 -0.92 -0.73 0.95 -0.18 -0.65 -0.84 -0.84 -0.64
lpF -0.48 - -0.15 0.11 0.35 -0.19 -0.47 0.89 -0.22 0.04 0.31 -0.24
lsF -0.77 -0.15 - 0.89 0.76 0.9 -0.72 -0.42 0.94 0.87 0.71 0.85
yrschF -0.91 0.11 0.89 - 0.93 0.89 -0.86 -0.18 0.79 0.96 0.88 0.81
yrschpriF -0.92 0.35 0.76 0.93 - 0.67 -0.87 0.07 0.66 0.88 0.96 0.58
yrschsecF -0.73 -0.19 0.9 0.89 0.67 - -0.68 -0.44 0.83 0.88 0.6 0.96
luM 0.95 -0.47 -0.72 -0.86 -0.87 -0.68 - -0.24 -0.66 -0.85 -0.87 -0.64
lpM -0.18 0.89 -0.42 -0.18 0.07 -0.44 -0.24 - -0.51 -0.24 0.07 -0.52
lsM -0.65 -0.22 0.94 0.79 0.66 0.83 -0.66 -0.51 - 0.84 0.66 0.86
yrschM -0.84 0.04 0.87 0.96 0.88 0.88 -0.85 -0.24 0.84 - 0.89 0.87
yrschpriM -0.84 0.31 0.71 0.88 0.96 0.6 -0.87 0.07 0.66 0.89 - 0.56
yrschsecM -0.64 -0.24 0.85 0.81 0.58 0.96 -0.64 -0.52 0.86 0.87 0.56 -
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. (2007). Introduction to modern economic growth. princeton University Press.
Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V. M., Ozdaglar, A., and Tahbaz-Salehi, A. (2012). The network origins
of aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 80:1977–2016.
Acemoglu, D. and Guierrieri, V. (2008). Capital deepening and nonbalanced economic growth.
Journal of Political Economy, 116 (3):467–498.
Alvarez, F. and Lucas, R. E. (2007). General equilibrium analysis of the eatonkortum model of
international trade. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54 (6):1726–1768.
American Community Survey Data (2007). http://www.census.gov/hhes/migration/data/acs/state-
to-state.html.
Andrews, D. W. K. (1993). Tests for parameter instability and structural change with unknown
change point. Econometrica, 61:821–856.
Andrews, D. W. K. and Ploberger, W. (1994). Optimal tests when a nuisance parameter is present
only under the alternative. Econometrica, 62:1383–1414.
Arbache, J. S. and Page, J. (2010). How fragile is africa’s recent growth? Journal of African
Economies, 19.1:1–24.
Ashby, N. J. (2007). Economic freedom and migration flows between U.S. states. Southern Eco-
nomic Journal, 73 (3):677–697.
Attfield, C. L. (2003). Structural Breaks and Convergence in Output Growth in the EU. University
of Bristol, Department of Economics.
Bai, J. (1997). Estimation of a change point in multiple regressions models. The Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 79:551–563.
Bai, J. (1999). Likelihood ratio tests for multiple structural changes. Journal of Econometrics,
91:299–323.
Bai, J. (2010). Common breaks in means and variances for panel data. Journal of Econometrics,
157:78–92.
Bai, J., Lumsdaine, R., and Stock, J. (1998). Testing and dating common breaks in multivariate
time series. Review of Economic Studies, 65:395–432.
Bai, J. and Perron, P. (1998). Estimating and testing linear models with multiple structural changes.
Econometrica, 66:47–78.
Bai, J. and Perron, P. (2003). Computation and analysis of multiple structural change models.
Journal of applied econometrics, 18.1:1–22.
102
Baltagi, B. H. and Li, D. (2004). Prediction in the panel data model with spatial correlation. In
Anselin, L., Florax, R., and Rey, S., editors, Advances in spatial econometrics, pages 283–295.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Banzhaf, H. S. and Walsh, R. P. (2008). Do people vote with their feet? an empirical test of tiebouts
mechanism. American Economic Review, 98 (3):843–863.
Barro, R. J. (1991). Economic growth in a cross section of countries. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 106:407–443.
Barro, R. J. (2012). Convergence and modernization revisited. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper Series 18295.
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1991). Convergence across states and regions. Economic Growth
Center, Yale University.
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992). Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, 100(2):223–
251.
Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (2003). Economic Growth, 2nd Edition, volume 1 of MIT Press
Books. The MIT Press.
Batini, N., Celasun, O., Dowling, T., Estevao, M., Keim, G., Sommer, M.,
and Tsounta, E. (2010). United states: Selected issues paper. Available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10248.pdf.
Baumol, W. J. (1986). Productivity growth, convergence, and welfare: What the long-run data
show. American Economic Review, 76(5):1072–1085.
Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., and Hansen, C. (2011). Inference for high-dimensional sparse
econometric models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1201.0220.
Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., and Hansen, C. (2012). Sparse models and methods for optimal
instruments with an application to eminent domian. Econometrica, 80.6:2369–2429.
Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., and Hansen, C. (2014). Inference on treatment effects after selection
among high-dimensional controls. The Review of Economic Studies, 81.2:608–650.
Belot, M. and Ederveen, S. (2012). Cultural barriers in migration between oecd countries. Journal
of Population Economics, 25:1077–1105.
Bertoli, S. and Moraga, J. F. (2013). Multilateral resistance to migration. Journal of Development
Economics, 102:79–100.
Bertoli, S., Moraga, J. F., and Ortega, F. (2013). Crossing the border: self-selection, earnings and
individual migration decisions. Journal of Development Economics, 101:75–91.
Braunerhjelm, P., Faini, R., Norman, V., Ruane, F., and Seabright, P. (2000). Monitoring European
Integration, volume 10. London: CEPR.
103
Caliendo, L. and Parro, F. (2014). Estimates of the trade and welfare effects of nafta.
Caliendo, L., Parro, F., Rossi-Hansberg, E., and Sarte, P. G. (2014). The impact of regional and
sectoral productivity changes on the u.s. economy. Federal reserve bank of Richmond, Working
paper: 13-14.
Case, A. C., Rosen, H. S., and Jr, J. R. H. (1993). Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdepen-
dence: Evidence from the states. Journal of public economics, 52.3:285–307.
CEPII (2014). http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp.
Chaney, T. (2014). The network structure of international trade. American economic review,
(forthcoming).
Chow, G. C. (1960). Test of equality between sets of coefficients in two linear regressions. Econo-
metrica, 28:591–605.
Coen-Pirani, D. (2010). Understanding gross worker flows across u.s. states. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 57:769–784.
Collier, P. (2007). The bottom billion: Why the Poorest countries are failing and what can be done
about it. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
Cso¨rgo¨, M. and Horva´th, L. (1997). Limit Theorems in Change-Point Analysis. New York: Wiley.
Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. (2002). Technology, geography, and trade. Econometrica, 70:1741–1779.
Echevarria, C. (1997). Changes in the sectoral composition associated with economic growth.
International Economic Review, 38 (2):431–452.
Elhorst, J. (2010). Spatial panel data models. In Fischer, M. M. and Getis, A., editors, Handbook
of Applied Spatial Analysis, pages 377–407. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Emerson, J. and Kao, C. (2000). Testing for structural change of a time trend regression in panel
data. Syracuse University Center for Policy Research Working Paper 15.
Eurostat (2014). http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.
Feng, Q., Kao, C., and Lazarova, S. (2009). Estimation of change points in panel models. Mimeo,
Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University.
Foerster, A. T., Sarte, P. G., and Watson, M. W. (2011). Sectoral vs. aggregate shocks: A structural
factor analysis of industrial production. Journal of Political Economy, 119(1):1–38.
Goston, N. and Nelson, D. (2013). Bridging trade theory and labor econometrics: the effects of
international migration. Journal of Economic Surveys, 27:98.
Han, A. K. and Park, D. (1989). Testing for structural change in panel data: Application to a study
of u.s. foreign trade in manufacturing goods. Review of Economics and Statistics, 71:135–142.
Hofstede, G. (2015). http://geert-hofstede.com/about-us.html.
104
Hofstede, G., Gert Jan Hofstede, and Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures and Organizations: Software of
the Mind. McGraw-Hill USA.
IMF (2014). http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm#financial.
International Country Risk Guide (2014). https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-
methodologies/icrg.
Jones, C. I. (1997). On the evolution of world income distribution. The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 11.3:19–36.
Kaplan, G. and Schulhofer-Wohl, S. (2013). Understanding the long-run decline in interstate mi-
gration. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Kennan, J. and Walker, J. R. (2011). The effect of expected income on individual migration deci-
sions. Econometrica, 79 (1):211–251.
Khan, F. A. (2011). The world is (almost) converging. International Conference On Applied
Economics ICOAE 2011.
Kiefer, J. (1959). K-Sample Analogues of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Cramer-V. Mises tests.
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 30:420–447.
Klein, P. and Ventura, G. (2007). Tfp differences and the aggregate effects of labor mobility in the
long run. B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 7-1:10.
Klein, P. and Ventura, G. (2009). Productivity differences and the dynamic effects of labor move-
ments. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56:1059–1073.
Lee, L. (2004). Asymptotic distributions of quasi-maximum likelihood estimators for spatial au-
toregressive models. Econometrica, 72:1899–1925.
Lee, L. and Yu, J. (2010). Estimation of spatial autoregressive panel data models with fixed effects.
Journal of Econometrics, 154:165–185.
Leeb, H. and Potscher, B. M. (2008). Sparse estimators and the oracle property, or the return of
Hodges’ estimator. Journal of Econometrics, 142(1):201–211.
Liao, W. (2008). Structural Breaks in Panel Data Models: A New Approach. PhD thesis, New
York University.
Molloy, R., Smith, C. L., and Wozniak, A. (2011). Internal migration in the united states. Journal
of Economic Perspective, 25-3:173–196.
Oberfield, E. (2013). Business networks, production chains, and productivity: A theory of input-
output architecture.
Palmer, J. and Pytlikova, M. (2013). Labor market laws and intra-europe migration: the role of the
state in shaping destination choices.
105
Pauwels, L. L., Chan, F., and Griffoli, T. M. (2012). Testing for structural change in heterogeneous
panels with an application to the euro’s trade effect. Journal of Time Series Econometrics.
Perron, P. (2006). Dealing with structural breaks. In Patterson, K. and Mills, T. C., editors, Palgrave
Handbook of Econometrics, volume 1, pages 278–352. Palgrave Macmillan.
Pritchett, L. (1997). Divergence, big time. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11.3:3–17.
Qu, Z. and Perron, P. (2007). Estimating and testing structural changes in multivariate regressions.
Econometrica, 75:459–502.
Redding, S. (2014). Goods trade, factor mobility and welfare.
Redding, S., Michaels, and Rauch, F. (2012). Urbanization and structural transformation. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 127:535–586.
Solow, R. M. (1956). A contribution to the theory of economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 70:65–94.
Thom, K. (2014). Repeated circular migration: Theory and evidence from undocumented migrants.
Working paper (New York University).
Tibshirani, R. (1996). Regression shrinkage and selection via the lasso. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series B (Methodological):267–288.
Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64
(5):416–424.
Treyz, G. I., Rickman, D. S., Hunt, G. L., and Greenwood, M. J. (1993). The dynamics of u.s.
internal migration. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 75 (2):209–214.
Wachter, S. and Tzavalis, E. (2012). Detection of structural breaks in linear dynamic panel data
models. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 56:3020–3034.
Wang, C.-K. (2014). Bilateral migration and multinationals: On the welfare effects of firm and
labor mobility. Working paper (Shandong University).
Wied, D. (2013). Cusum-type testing for changing parameters in a spatial autoregressive model for
stock returns. Journal of Time Series Analysis, 34:221–229.
World Bank Reports (2011). http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/wdr2011.
Yu, J., Jong, R., and Lee, L. (2008). Quasi-maximum likelihood estimators for spatial dynamic
panel data with fixed effects when both n and T are large. Journal of Econometrics, 146.1:118–
134.
Curriculum Vitae
Education
Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2015 (expected)
Dissertation Title: Structural Change, Convergence and Networks: Theoretical and Em-
pirical Analyses
Dissertation Committee: Pierre Perron, Zhongjun Qu and Hiroaki Kaido
On leave of absence in 2011-2012
M.S., Quantitative Economics, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 2007
B.Sc. (Honours), Economics, St. Xaviers College, Calcutta University, India, 2005
Fields of Interest
Econometrics, Computational Economics, Regional Economics
Fellowships and Awards
Deans Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2009-present
Special Research Fellowship, Boston University, Fall 2014
Graduate Fellowship, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India, 2005-2007
Ranked 1st in the M.S. Quantitative Economics program 2005-2007
Ranked 3rd in the B.Sc. (Honours) program in Calcutta University
Work Experience
Summer Analyst, Science Team, AIG, New York City, NY, Summer 2014
Actuarial Analyst, Auto Strategic Research Team, Liberty Mutual Insurance, Boston, MA,
2011-2012 (during leave of absence from BU)
Summer Intern, Analytics and Research Team Personal Market, Travelers Insurance, Hartford,
CT, Summer 2010
Consultant, Actuarial Risk and Advanced Analytics Team, Deloitte Consulting, Hyderabad,
India, 2007-2009
Working Papers
“Testing for a Structural Break in a Spatial Panel Model” (Job Market Paper).
“Economic Incentives and Social Frictions: Dynamics of Cross-Country Migration”
(with Anindya S. Chakrabarti)
“Falling Behind or Catching Up - Structural Break Story of Africa’s Convergence” (with Fan
Zhuo)
Work in Progress
“Spatial Panel Modeling of Origin Destination Flows”
107
Teaching Experience
Teaching Assistant, Advanced Statistics for Economists (Ph. D. course), Department of Eco-
nomics, Boston University, Fall 2013
Teaching Assistant, Econometrics (MA course), Department of Economics, Boston University,
Spring 2015
Teaching Fellow, Principles of Macroeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston Univer-
sity, Spring 2014, Spring 2013
Teaching Fellow, Principles of Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Boston Univer-
sity, Fall 2012, Spring 2011, Fall 2010
Presentations
Econometrics Seminar, Boston University, November 2014
Boston University/Boston College Green Line Econometrics Meeting, Boston, MA, December
2014
Computer Skills: R, SAS, MATLAB, STATA, VBA, Microsoft Office, LATEX
Citizenship: Indian
Contact: 465 Washington Blvd, Apt - 3006S, Jersey City, NJ 07310
